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PREFACE
“Studies on Emergencies and Disaster Relief” is a
series of research reports on topics of relevance to
everybody working with relief and development
assistance in unstable situations. Most of the
studies so far have been conducted by the
Refugees Studies Programme at Queen Elisabeth
House, University of Oxford. Sida, in close co-
operation with the Nordic Africa Institute, is
publishing these reports in order to throw more
light on the complex relations of today’s conflicts
and emergencies.
A considerable share of Swedish assistance is
channelled to meet the immediate needs from all
sorts of emergencies. In recent years the contribu-
tions for disaster relief and humanitarian assis-
tance in conflicts caused by war has increased
considerably and amounts today to approxima-
tely three quarters of the total disaster relief
budget.
In the present two issues of special concern to
Sida are covered; the emergency situation in
Angola after the return to civil war in 1992 and the
role of the UN Department of Humanitarian
Affairs in dealing with the coordination of disaster
relief. These are two subjects which up till today
have been very little covered.
This report describes the activities of the
United Nations Department of Humanitarian
Affairs (DHA) in Angola from April 1993 to April
1995. It starts with the creation of DHA Angola in
1993 and continues to describe how relations were
established with the Government and UNITA. It
covers the different ways in which main concepts
and roles and responsibilities could be discussed
and agreed to. It presents the day-to-day activities
including the crucial information exchange. It
shows how DHA organised the preparation and
launching of inter-agency appeals. It describes
how DHA promoted and monitored the safety of
humanitarian agency personnel and how capacity
building was made one of the important strategies
of DHA.
It is our hope that this report will contribute to
the ongoing discussion on disaster relief and the
different mechanisms such as the coordination of
different actors during the actual conflict phase.
Carin Norberg
Director
Department for Cooperation with NGOs and Humanitarian Assistance,
Sida, and member of the Programme and Research Council of the
Nordic Africa Institute
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This report describes the activities of the United
Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs
(DHA) in Angola from April 1993 to April 1995. It
does not aim to evaluate the activities undertaken
or compare them to DHA’s work in other
countries, such as Iraq or Mozambique.
I worked for the United Nations Development
Programme (UNDP) in Angola when DHA estab-
lished its Humanitarian Assistance Coordination
Unit (UCAH) there in April 1993. UNDP seconded
me to UCAH, where I served as NGO & donor
liaison officer during 1993, as the representative in
Huambo during 1994, and as the interim manager
of the emergency relief office from January to June
1995. I then left Angola after three years in the
country and it has taken me some months to step
back from the experience to write this report,
which represents my own views and not those of
the United Nations or DHA.
Much of the information in this paper is from
UN documents, such as reports of the UN Secre-
tary-General to the Security Council. Much of it,
too, is based on my own experience garnered from
holding various positions within UCAH.
My thanks are due to Manuel Aranda da Silva,
the former director of DHA in Angola and now
with the department in New York, for his
comments on the outline of this report. Comments
on the outline also came from staff at UCAH, in
particular Peter Simkin, Carlos Veloso, and Yvon
Madore. Finally, I am most grateful to three
people who laboured through drafts of the report
and made helpful suggestions: Sarah Longford at
DHA Geneva, Barbara Harrell-Bond at the
University of Oxford’s Refugee Studies
Programme, and Harry Rutter in London. I am
responsible for the contents of this report and any
mistakes are, of course, mine, not theirs.
Finally, I dedicate this report to a former col-
league and friend in Huambo, Alfredo “Alfa”
Afonso, who served the UN and me as a loyal









Preface and Acknowledgements 3
Map of Angola 4
Abbreviations 7
I. Executive Summary 8
II. Background 10
Independence, Civil War, Peace, Elections, and War 10
III. The Establishment of DHA Angola 13
Calls for Coordination and the Arrival of DHA 13
UCAH’s Link to the SRSG, UNAVEM, and UN Agencies 13
UCAH’s Terms of Reference: Coordination not Operation 14
Initial Organisation: Human Resources, Office Space, and Equipment 15
Administration and Finance 15
Administrative and Management Capacity 16
IV. Humanitarian Diplomacy & Advocacy 17
Establishing Contact with the GoA in Luanda and with UNITA in Huambo 17
Negotiating Aid with the GoA and UNITA 17
Developing Principles for Humanitarian Programmes 18
1993 and 1994 Linkage 18
Working with UNITA within a Sanctions Regime 19
V. Humanitarian Policy & Strategies 20
The Sanctity of Aid 20
Relief, Rehabilitation, and Development 20
Consolidating the Strengths of UN Agencies and NGOs 20
The Emergency Relief Plan 21
VI. Main Features of Coordination 23
Information Exchange 23
Maintaining Relations with the GoA and UNITA 23
Coordinating with UN Agencies 24
Establishing and Maintaining Relations with Donors 24
Working with NGOs 24
Assessing Needs 25
Field Advisers 25
Coordination in Times of Peace 26
VII. Special Coordination Mechanisms to Enhance Operations 28
The ASDI-UCAH Mechanism 28
The Seeds and Tools Working Group 28
Provincial Meetings 29
The Humanitarian Coordination Group 29
VIII. Preparing & Launching Appeals 30
1993 Appeal Preparation and Launch 30
Revised Appeal: February 1994 30
Revised Appeal: September 1994 31
6
1995 Appeal 31
A Model Launch 32
IX. Security Issues 33
Procedures for Airlifts & Convoys 33
Cross-line Operations: Kuito 33
Freedom of Movement Crises 35
Security Coordination when Aid Workers are Under Threat 36
Security Recommendations for Luanda and Angola 37
Evacuation of Foreigners 37
Monitoring the Road Situation 38
X. Capacity Building 39
The Angolan Government 39
Institute of Mine Action 39
Institute of Demobilisation and Reintegration 40
Capacity Building for UNITA 40
Angolan NGOs 40
Preparing for Transition from UCAH to UNDP 41
7
ABBREVIATIONS
ADRA Acção para o Desenvolvimento Rural e Ambiente
ASDI Autoridade Sueca para o Desenvolvimento Internacional
AUM ASDI–UCAH Mechanism
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DRO Demobilisation and Reintegration Office
ECHO European Community Humanitarian Office
ECU (UN) Emergency Coordination Unit
FAA Forças Angolanas Armadas
FALD Field Administration Logistics Division
FNLA Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola
GoA Government of Angola
HCG Humanitarian Coordination Group
HF High Frequency
ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross
IDP Internally Displaced Person
IO International Organisation
IOV Inter-office Voucher
MINARS Ministerio de Assistência e Reinserção Social
MPLA Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola
MSF Medecins sans Frontières
MTs Metric Tonnes
NGO Non-governmental Organisation
NKw Novos Kwanzas (Angolan currency during the period under review)
SCAM Sociedade Cristã de Ajuda Mutua
SCF–UK Save the Children Fund-United Kingdom
SRPA (UN) Special Relief Programme for Angola
SRSG Special Representative of the Secretary-General
UCAH Unidade de Coordenação para Assistência Humanitária
UHF Ultra-high Frequency
UNAVEM United Nations Angola Verification Mission
UNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNDHA United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNFAO United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation
UNFPA United Nations Population Fund
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund
UNITA União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola
VORGAN Voz do Galo Negro
WFP World Food Programme
WHO World Health Organisation
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I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Angola returned to civil war in October 1992,
after only eighteen months of peace. The country
might have thought that it knew how to cope in
times of war, yet the conflict that struck shortly
after Angola’s first presidential and
parliamentary elections was more violent than
anything the population had experienced
previously. Within just a few months after the
outbreak of war, some two million Angolans
were in need of emergency relief. This number
almost doubled over the course of 1993 and
1994.1 Heavy fighting took place in virtually all
of the eighteen provincial capitals, many of which
remained under siege until peace was once again
established on 20 November 1994. The war
touched all Angolans directly or indirectly: The
economy collapsed; commercial ties broke down;
social services stopped; agriculture ceased;
families separated.
The humanitarian response to the suffering
induced by the crisis was slow when it broke at
the end of 1992. Most aid agencies, indeed nearly
all Angolans, were caught by surprise by the
renewal of fighting. Few had personnel with
emergency experience and fewer still had the
appropriate programme inputs to deal with the
consequences of conflict. What the humanitarian
response really lacked, however, was an organis-
ation to provide leadership, and support imple-
menting agencies to develop a framework with
which to mount coordinated programmes to
address the civil war’s misery. In March 1993,
DHA was called on to provide such a role. This
report explains how DHA took on the task and
developed different aspects of coordination from
April 1993 to April 1995.
The ‘Establishment of DHA Angola’ shows
how the calls of different actors, such as UN
agencies or NGOs, led to DHA’s creating a
coordination unit in the country. Perhaps para-
mount to the whole experience was that almost
every organisation involved in humanitarian
assistance wanted coordination, albeit ‘light and
not bureaucratic’. DHA’s relationship with diffe-
rent UN structures was clearly defined and terms
of reference were compatible with the
                                                
1 For details of numbers of affected populations refer
to DHA’s consolidated inter-agency appeals of 1993
and 1994.
expectations of what was needed: a small group
of professionals who spent all of their time on
facilitating coordination. The reasoning behind
UCAH was that it be a support structure to the
SRSG, whom the Security Council had endowed
with the mandate to coordinate humanitarian
assistance. In reality, the SRSG relied on UCAH to
coordinate. Neither Dame Margaret Joan Anstee
nor Maître Alioune Blondin Beye, both of whom
were SRSGs at separate times during UCAH’s
first two years, became operationally involved in
the coordination of humanitarian assistance. They
did, however, advocate humanitarian issues and
provide high-level diplomacy to support the
cause. Further, when in Luanda, they held
meetings with UN agencies, donors and NGOs.
This section also highlights UCAH’s internal
organisation and administration. UCAH could
not have been established or survived the first six
months without material and personnel inputs
from UNAVEM and UNDP. Too little material
support was available from DHA Geneva and
New York.
‘Humanitarian Diplomacy & Advocacy’ ex-
plains how UCAH established contact with the
GoA and UNITA to address humanitarian issues,
and how the unit developed the notion of advo-
cacy. UCAH’s ‘open door’ policy promoted dia-
logue between the unit, UN agencies, and donors,
and NGOs so that, together, they could agree to
certain principles and issues. UCAH then dis-
cussed these with both sides to the conflict.
‘Humanitarian Policy and Strategies’ demon-
strates some of the ways in which UCAH pro-
vided an environment in which main concepts
and roles and responsibilities could be discussed
and agreed to. Separating humanitarian affairs as
much as possible from political and military
issues, and placing the ‘emergency’ within a
development context were overriding concerns.
Defining which UN agency would be responsible
for particular activities and bringing together UN
agencies and NGOs to work in a collaborative
spirit is highlighted. Further, an ambience which
promoted dialogue, analysis, and planning led to
agencies being able to take sound, yet flexible,
decisions throughout the period under review
(April 1993–April 1995).
The ‘Main Features of Coordination’ presents
UCAH’s day-to-day activities, of which promot-
9
ing information exchange was crucial to the
success of the humanitarian programme. Daily
contact with the two parties to the conflict was
part of UCAH’s standard work, as was develop-
ing close working relations with and helping to
build constructive links between donors, UN
agencies, and NGOs. As UCAH spent all of its
time on coordination, i.e. it did not implement
projects, it was seen as the most appropriate
organ to lead inter-agency needs assessments.
These took place frequently and strove to include
members of the GoA or UNITA, donors, UN
agencies, and NGOs. One weakness of the
assessments was the lack of a common format to
conduct them, although this was resolved in early
1995 by the Humanitarian Coordination Group
(HCG), created in early 1995 in light of Angola’s
peace agreement. In preparation for peace, UCAH
hired personnel to plan for an expansion of
humanitarian activities to include mine action
and demobilisation and reintegration. In addition,
there were some ‘Special Coordination
Mechanisms to Enhance Operations’, such as a
fund for Angolan and expatriate NGOs donated
by the Swedish International Development
Authority and managed by UCAH.
Humanitarian assistance depended on the pro-
vision of financial and material resources. In
‘Preparing and Launching Appeals’, the report
shows how DHA organised the preparation and
launching of inter-agency appeals. These in-
formed donors about the humanitarian crisis, the
planned response to it, and the resources that
would be necessary to carry out activities. Donors
and NGOs became increasingly involved in the
appeal process, which called for resources for
both UN agencies and NGOs.
Working in a conflict often brought the safety
of personnel and operations to the fore. ‘Security
Issues’ demonstrates how UCAH promoted and
monitored the safety of humanitarian agency per-
sonnel. The unit facilitated the establishment of
security procedures for air and road operations.
UCAH worked together with various agencies,
UN and non-governmental, to ensure that pro-
grammes proceeded in the safest way possible.
When staff were in danger, concerted action was
taken to evacuate them. Operations in Huambo,
Kuito, and Malange posed special challenges for
aid workers and for UCAH’s staff involved in
security issues.
‘Capacity Building’ is discussed in this report’s
final section, although it became one of UCAH’s
most important strategies during 1994. It was
clear to the unit’s staff that the humanitarian
crisis afflicting Angola was not a finite event that
a group of expatriates could resolve. The solution
lay with Angolans and much of UCAH’s task was
to support them with their work. UCAH’s
director worked closely with the Angolan
Government to encourage it to assume ever-
increasing emergency management capacity. This
process was enhanced within the framework of
the Humanitarian Coordination Group, which
incorporated members of UNITA. Long-term
issues, such as mine action and demobilisation
and reintegration initially were to be managed by
UCAH, which worked with the GoA and UNITA
to establish Angolan institutes to tackle both
issues. In addition, support to Angolan NGOs so
that they might be fully incorporated into
emergency relief programmes was a standard
part of UCAH’s NGO liaison task.
Finally, one often hears that an organisation is
only as good as its leader. If this is true, UCAH
must have been rather good for its director
embodied many qualities that are important to
coordination: political savvy, diplomacy, leader-
ship, and teamwork. In addition, he understood
the context in which Angola’s crisis was occur-
ring, had experience in the coordination of
humanitarian emergencies, and spoke the rele-
vant languages. UCAH was much more than just
one person, however. Its corps staff had most of
the following qualifications or characteristics, all
of which are important: a background in deve-
lopment issues; previous work experience in
government ministries, UN agencies, or NGOs;
familiarity with Angola or a similar setting in the
same region, such as Mozambique; spoken and
written fluency in the relevant languages (English
and Portuguese); a keen interest in and
understanding of the UN and the Department of
Humanitarian Affairs; team spirit; hard work and
a commitment to excellence; and a participatory
or ‘open door’ attitude toward all actors involved
in humanitarian assistance.
As is shown in the body of this report, the
support of UN agencies, donors, and NGOs
combined with the qualifications and character-
istics of UCAH’s staff created an environment in
which coordination could flourish. While every
humanitarian emergency is unique and needs to
be addressed in a particular way, many of the
coordination activities that UCAH carried out




Independence, Civil War, Peace, Elections,
and War
Angola has been at war almost constantly since
1961, when the armed liberation struggle against
the Portuguese colonial regime started. That
struggle ended in January 1975, when the leaders
of the three nationalist movements (Frente
Nacional de Libertação de Angola—FNLA, Movi-
mento Popular de Libertação de Angola—MPLA,
and União Nacional para a Independência Total
de Angola—UNITA) and Portugal signed the
Alvor Agreement establishing a coalition govern-
ment and setting 11 November 1975 as inde-
pendence day. The coalition collapsed in
February of that year, however, and the country
went to war: The FNLA and Zairean troops
attacked Luanda from the north; The South
African Defence Force invaded the south and
pushed on toward the capital; and, Cuban troops
arrived to defend the MPLA, whose leader
Agostinho Neto was sworn in as the first
president of the People’s Republic of Angola on
11 November.
During the rest of the 1970s and much of the
1980s, civil war between the MPLA and UNITA
(complicated by cold war interests and the
regional power’s meddling) raged in Angola’s
countryside, especially in the central and
southern provinces. The former-USSR and Cuba
backed the MPLA. The United States of America
backed UNITA, which also got support from
South Africa, itself interested in attacking
members of the South West Africa People’s
Organisation in Angola. By the late 1980s, war
had devastated most of the country’s
infrastructure and caused tremendous suffering.
The UN addressed this in October 1990 by
launching the Special Relief Programme for
Angola (SRPA), coordinated by the United
Nations Development Programme’s Emergency
Coordination Unit (ECU).
Portugal, the USA and the former USSR (the
troika countries) brokered a peace agreement,
known as the Bicesse Accords and signed on 31
May 1991. The troika invited the United Nations
to observe and verify the peace agreement. The
accords called for troop demobilisation and the
creation of one Angolan army, political reconcili-
ation and the extension of government to all of
Angola’s provinces, based on the outcome of
Angola’s first multi-party elections.
SRPA expanded its operation throughout the
Bicesse period and facilitated humanitarian assis-
tance programmes in central and southern
Angola. As peace was consolidated, humanitarian
agencies turned their attention increasingly to
rehabilitation and development activities. Devel-
opment staff replaced emergency staff and UNDP
decided to end the SRPA and close the ECU at the
end of 1992.
Parliamentary and presidential elections took
place on 28–29 September 1992. International
observers monitored them and the Special Repre-
sentative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) deemed
them, ‘generally free and fair’. The parliamentary
election showed an overwhelming victory for the
MPLA. In the presidential election, the MPLA’s
Jose Eduardo dos Santos did not quite manage
the necessary ‘fifty percent plus 1 vote’ to avoid a
run-off, but UNITA’s Jonas Savimbi trailed him
badly.
UNITA argued that the elections were rigged
and refused to accept the results. During the first
week of October, UNITA withdrew its generals
and cadres from the recently established Forças
Armadas Angolanas (FAA). UNITA’s army began
intimidating MPLA representatives in rural
municipalities causing them to leave, thereby
taking de facto control of almost three quarters of
Angola’s municipalities by the end of October.
This left the government in control of the coastal
strip and all but one of the provincial capitals, as
shown on the map below. (Shaded areas and
circles indicate areas under government control in
late October 1992).
The MPLA could do little to stop UNITA from
occupying rural municipalities: Most former
MPLA soldiers had abandoned their arms and left
the army during 1991 and 1992. The FAA was
weak and badly equipped. Only one group, an
elite corps of troops referred to as ninjas, could
help the government defend its interests in key
areas such as the provincial capitals. Before
reverting to force, however, the MPLA turned to
the internationally community for help.
The SRSG worked relentlessly to get the peace
process back on track, but her efforts were ham-
pered by several factors. First, UN headquarters
did not know what to do. The Security Council
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mission, UNAVEM II, was supposed to close its
sixty-five team sites and leave Angola by 31
October 1992. In light of the post-electoral crisis,
however, many people argued that the unarmed
UN police and military observers should stay in
the countryside to monitor the political and mili-
tary situation. Even if the observers were power-
less to act, they could report on the situation as it
evolved. Others at headquarters felt that the
observers neither had the mandate nor the equip-
ment to stay in Angola during a conflict. Further,
it would be better to withdraw most teams and
maintain a small observer presence to support the
SRSG with a ‘UN good offices’ strategy to get the
GoA and UNITA back to the peace process.2
Second, there was a split in the troika: Portugal
and the Russian Federation recognised the MPLA
as a legitimate government; but the United States
did not. Third, South Africa, the most powerful
nation in the region, failed to recognise the MPLA
as a legitimate government. This sent a signal to
the MPLA that South Africa might yet return to
its historic role and support UNITA. In sum, the
MPLA or Angolan Government, as it could legit-
imately call itself, could not rely on the interna-
tional community’s support.
By the end of October the government had
decided to take decisive action to ensure its sur-
vival. From 31 October to 2 November 1992,
conflict erupted between the MPLA and UNITA
in the capital, Luanda. This resulted in UNITA’s
elimination from the city and the death of key
figures in the party, such as the vice-president
and secretary-general.3 Shortly thereafter, battles
ensued in the most important provincial capitals
where the government fought to maintain control
by expelling UNITA. In most cases, this policy
was successful. UNITA was forced out of
fourteen provincial capitals, but by late
November 1992 the party controlled four: Caxito,
M’Banza Congo, N’Dalatando, and Uige.
                                                
2 This view eventually took hold. UNAVEM teams
were called to Luanda and asked to prepare to leave
Angola. Indeed, fifty-nine out of the sixty-five team
sites closed by 25 January 1993 leaving the UN in five
sites along the coast and one in the interior town of
Lubango.
3 It is not in the scope of this paper to discuss the battle
in Luanda. Suffice it to say that it was the turning point
in the breakdown of the Bicesse Accords. UNITA’s
provocation toward the population of Luanda during
October and the violent response to it, both by
government forces and the population at large, led to
the party’s political extermination as well as the
incarceration or death of many personal allies and
relatives of Jonas Savimbi.
During November and December 1992, the
United Nations scrambled to salvage the Bicesse
Accords but the battles between the government
and UNITA became more serious and the hopes
for peace more remote. As the new year came,
any doubts that Angola had returned to war were
dispelled when battles started in two additional
provincial capitals, Huambo and Kuito. UNITA
gained control of Huambo, Angola’s second city,
on 6 March 1993. (The battle for Kuito dragged on
until mid-September).4
The nature of the civil war that erupted in
Angola differed from previous wars in the coun-
try. Whereas the wars of the 1960s, 1970s, and
1980s mostly took place in rural areas, this con-
flict concentrated in the main cities. In almost all
cases, if the government managed to expel
UNITA from a provincial capital, government
control extended no further than the city limits.
UNITA usually controlled all surrounding areas,
thus creating a siege situation affecting hundreds
of thousands of Angolans.
The return to war surprised almost all
observers and participants in Angola. The politi-
cians dealing with the peace process were con-
vinced that if the election went smoothly, the
results would bind the political parties to peace.
However, some members of the UNDP’s
Emergency Coordination Unit, who travelled
extensively throughout Angola during the second
half of 1992, were less convinced about the
country’s bright future. They warned that troop
demobilisation was not proceeding as planned
and that war could break out again. The reports
of the ECU field coordinators, however, conflicted
with the main activities of the UNDP: support to
the electoral process and development. The
agency’s attention had turned away from its ECU
and its experienced staff, whose existence in
Angola was no longer thought to be necessary.
Renewed fighting in Angola called for
UNDP’s leadership to address the situation. Little
was forthcoming. The agency neither sought the
necessary resources to keep core staff or hire new
employees for the ECU, nor fomented a spirit of
collaboration amongst the UN agencies to address
the crisis. UNDP’s sole contribution to keeping
                                                
4 UNITA spent considerable time and effort trying to
convince the international community that the civil war
was ethnic, i.e. that the GoA was trying to eliminate
UNITA because most of its support came from the
Ovimbundu people. Few members of the international
community took such claims seriously, feeling instead
that the war erupted because of one side’s political
grievance against the other’s. Political ambitions, rather
than ethnic tensions, were behind the war.
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the ECU alive were two programme officers with
no previous emergency experience. Other UN
agencies and many non-governmental organisa-
tions (NGOs) also found it difficult to respond to
the new circumstance of war. Many organisations
had personnel for development programmes,
which had been planned since early 1991. Few of
these employees had emergency experience and
fewer still wanted to work in a conflict situation.
Many organisations lost their materials during
October as warehouses were looted during erup-
tions of violence. The UN World Food Pro-
gramme (WFP) was the first UN agency to
understand that Angola was back at war and
quickly mobilised the resources to deal with the
situation. WFP led efforts to reach civilians in
need and provide them with basic assistance from
November 1992 to March 1993.
By March 1993, prospects for a speedy return
to peace were slim. The humanitarian crisis was
expanding yet the UN agency and NGO response
to the situation was weak. There was no structure
in the country capable of promoting collaboration
among the different agencies, thereby harnessing
their work and facilitating a coordinated
approach to the emergency. The Angolan Gov-
ernment no longer had access to most of the terri-
tory and asked the UN for help to confront the
mounting humanitarian crisis.
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III. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF DHA ANGOLA
Calls For Coordination and the Arrival
of DHA
As demonstrated above, there was a clear need
for coordination by March 1993. All actors
involved in humanitarian assistance in Angola
understood this. The main factors that led to
DHA establishing a coordination unit in Angola
were:
– The Angolan Government approached the
SRSG and requested the UN to coordinate
humanitarian assistance throughout the coun-
try. The SRSG, a former UNDP resident repre-
sentative, acknowledged that UNDP was un-
prepared to handle such a task in Angola and
sought other solutions.
– The SRSG advised the Secretary-General of
massive human suffering and asked for
support to address the issue while continuing
political initiatives to get the government and
UNITA to return to peace.
– The Security Council became increasingly con-
cerned about the consequences of renewed
fighting and the need for coordination of
humanitarian assistance. On 12 March 1993, the
Security Council issued resolution 811,
operative paragraph 10 of which ‘encouraged
the Special Representative of the Secretary-
General to coordinate humanitarian assistance,
with the resources at her disposal’.
– Donor delegations from the United States and
Sweden visited Angola in January and March
1993 and called for action. While the US dele-
gation felt that the existing UNDP structure
could be strengthened, the Swedes initiated
informal contacts with the former Under-Secre-
tary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, Jan
Eliasson, and encouraged him to act.
– NGOs, in particular CARE International,
Medecins sans Frontières-Belgique, and Save the
Children Fund (UK), called on the UN agencies
to address humanitarian issues with
coordinated policies and programmes.
– UNICEF and WFP, two of the most active
agencies in Angola at the time, called for DHA
to establish an office in Angola to coordinate
humanitarian assistance, although both agen-
cies cited concerns that coordination not lead to
additional bureaucracy.
DHA sent a mission to Angola in March 1993 to
analyse the situation and look at humanitarian
coordination. The mission concluded that UN
agencies needed support as quickly as possible to
harness their efforts. While the SRSG was well
qualified to deal with humanitarian coordination,
she did not have time to do so on a day-to-day
basis because of her responsibilities trying to get
the two warring sides to negotiate peace. The
SRSG would need a support unit to coordinate
humanitarian assistance. UNDP was neither will-
ing nor capable of providing such a unit. DHA,
therefore, assumed the task. Its links to the United
Nations structures in the country would need to
be clearly defined.
UCAH’s Links to the SRSG, UNAVEM,
and UN Agencies
The highest ranking UN official in Angola in 1993
was the SRSG, who had the rank of under-
secretary-general.5 While there are many under-
secretaries-general and several SRSG’s world-
wide, only the Secretary-General himself holds a
higher position in the organisation. As such,
SRSGs can have a lot of influence over other UN
structures in a country even though the activities
of an SRSG may differ entirely from those of the
UN humanitarian agencies.
The Secretary-General assigned a special
representative to Angola to head the UN Angola
Verification Mission II (UNAVEM II). UNAVEM
II was established to verify the implementation of
the Bicesse Accords. Its mission was political and
was carried out by civilian staff and military and
police observers. UNAVEM II was widely seen,
albeit incorrectly, as the cause of the failure of the
Bicesse Accords. Both the government and
UNITA accused UNAVEM of being partial to the
other side, and UNITA often called for with-
drawal of the SRSG. By February 1993, hostility
towards UNAVEM became more commonplace.
Demonstrations took place outside the UN
building in Luanda with people hurling insults at
the UN for having ‘led the country back to war’,
and rocks were thrown at UNAVEM vehicles
entering the capital from the mission’s compound
outside Luanda.
                                                
5 Dame Margaret Joan Anstee served as SRSG until 30
June 1993, after which Maître Alioune Blondin Beye
took over. He continued in the position throughout
1994 and 1995.
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The UN agencies had been in Angola before
UNAVEM’s establishment and were to continue
in the country when the UN mission left. Their
task was to support Angolans working on emer-
gency, rehabilitation, and development issues. To
be able to carry out their work, the agencies
needed to be welcome and useful. When calls for
coordination of humanitarian assistance came
from a number of actors and the UN Security
Council endorsed the SRSG to lead the effort, UN
agencies were anxious: They supported the SRSG
but raised concerns that they might be brought
into the UN’s political activities, which were the
brunt of much criticism at the time. Conse-
quently, they distanced themselves from
UNAVEM II explaining that they had nothing to
do with the political process or military events.
As far as the agencies were concerned, they were
in Angola to carry out only their respective man-
dates.
When DHA established itself in Angola in
April 1993, it found itself in an awkward position:
called on to establish a unit to support the SRSG
but having to distance itself from the UN’s
political activities because Angolans, the govern-
ment, and UNITA, perceived them as a failure.
Further, DHA was to coordinate the UN’s
humanitarian agencies who were wary of close
involvement with the SRSG and UNAVEM II.
DHA handled this in several ways.
First, it agreed that its representative in
Angola report to the SRSG: this flowed from
DHA’s role of providing support to the SRSG
with her mandate of coordinating humanitarian
assistance.6 However, DHA insisted that its
director in Angola also report to the Under
Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs at
headquarters in New York. Second, there was to
be no operational link between DHA Angola and
UNAVEM II. While the two branches of the UN
shared information, their tasks were different.
Third, DHA invited the main UN agency in
Angola, WFP, to second a staff member to DHA
to become the director of the new coordination
unit. (DHA and WFP selected a well-qualified
                                                
6 The role really became one of the SRSG relying on
DHA’s unit, UCAH, to handle co-ordination while the
SRSG worked to resolve Angola’s political problems.
Upon UCAH’s establishment, the SRSG was in Abidjan
trying to negotiate a peace agreement with the GoA
and UNITA. In late 1993 and during virtually all of
1994, the new SRSG worked in Lusaka, Zambia, where
he brokered Angola’s current peace agreement. While
UCAH’s director spoke to the SRSG daily to brief him
on the humanitarian situation, the latter rarely got
operationally involved, preferring instead to use high-
level diplomacy to advocate humanitarian issues.
emergency manager, who headed the WFP in the
Sudan at the time and had previously been a
government minister in Mozambique. He arrived
in Angola to establish and direct the
Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Unit,
known by its Portuguese acronym UCAH, on 17
April 1993). Fourth, DHA asked UN agencies to
second staff members to the new unit, thereby
giving the agencies the chance to ensure that
UCAH’s staff would understand the agencies and
work to add value to their programmes.
UCAH’s role as a coordination structure
vis-à-vis  the UNDP was defined in the following
way: UCAH would coordinate all activities
related to the ongoing emergency and UNDP
would continue to coordinate development activ-
ities. (There were very few in Angola in 1993 and
1994). While some staff members at UNDP
pushed the idea that UCAH be a support unit for
UNDP, this idea was quickly rejected. The defini-
tion of UCAH’s position with regard to UNDP
culminated in a communiqué addressed to the
UNDP Resident Representative in Angola by the
Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian
Affairs and the former UNDP Administrator,
William Draper III, who instructed the UNDP
Resident Representative to hand-over all emer-
gency coordination to UCAH’s newly appointed
director. While this instruction could have been
tampered with by arguing over what should or
should not be considered ‘emergency coordina-
tion’ the UNDP Resident Representative agreed
that he should not coordinate the emergency and
collaborated with UCAH staff.
UCAH’s Terms of Reference: Coordination not
Operation
The most important concept on which the unit
was based was that it would not implement pro-
grammes, but would facilitate coordination of all
actors providing emergency assistance. Described
as a unit to support the SRSG, its terms of refer-
ence included to:
– coordinate with all parties involved in the
emergency activities and humanitarian pro-
grammes of the United Nations agencies, bilat-
eral donors, and NGOs;
– facilitate speedy delivery of emergency com-
modities and increase programme efficiency by
eliminating duplication of effort;
– gather, evaluate, and disseminate to all con-
cerned parties information relevant to the
humanitarian assistance programme, providing
regular updates of unmet and additional needs
of the affected population;
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– propose policy recommendations relating to
the implementation of the humanitarian
assistance in cooperation with the UN
operational and specialised agencies
concerned, giving special attention to all
aspects of the reintegration of returnees,
refugees, displaced persons, and vulnerable
groups;
– monitor emergency needs arising from the
unforeseen displacement of populations; and
– prepare documentation for donor meetings,
appeals for support, and other consultations as
required.
Initial Organisation: Human Resources, Office
Space, and Equipment
One of the main problems facing UCAH upon its
establishment were human and financial
resources. The only staff member specifically sent
to Angola to work in UCAH was the director.
Human resources came from UNAVEM II, from
which the SRSG offered four staff on a short-term
basis. UNDP seconded one expatriate staff
member to the unit and agreed that UCAH
absorb all of the Angolan staff administratively
assigned to the ECU.
During the unit’s first three months, donors
who had committed funds to the former ECU,
made them available to UCAH thereby allowing
the unit to hire one additional expatriate. Further,
in July 1993, UNICEF seconded an expatriate staff
member to UCAH; hence, three months after its
establishment, UCAH had four expatriates: the
director, a monitoring and evaluation officer, a
policy adviser, and an NGO/donor liaison offi-
cer.7 About a dozen locally hired staff members
supported the unit with crucial secretarial, trans-
lating, and transport services. (Most of them had
previous experience in the ECU and instituted
important office procedures, such as a central
registry and filing system). The staff on loan from
UNAVEM either returned there or left Angola.
Concerning UCAH’s location, the UN system
used two main buildings in the capital, Luanda.
The first was the site of the UN agencies and was
known as the UN building. The second stood just
outside the city limits and housed UNAVEM. The
                                                
7 The tasks of the information and public relations
officer were assumed by the policy adviser and the
NGO/donor liaison officer. This arrangement lasted
until December 1993, when DHA hired a staff member
to assume information and donor liaison. This was
supplemented in late 1994, when UCAH hired two
additional staff: one reporting officer and one donor
liaison officer.
issue arose of whether UCAH should be located
in UNAVEM II’s compound outside the city or in
the UN building. Both UNAVEM and UN agency
staff argued that the unit should be located in
their respective buildings; even though UCAH
was to have no link to UNAVEM and the UN
building had little available space. Donors and
NGOs supported the view that UCAH should be
located inside the city, not in a compound outside
it. A convenient solution was found. UCAH used
a former UNAVEM office in the heart of Luanda,
placing the unit physically (and symbolically)
between the UN agency building and the SRSG’s
main office in the UNAVEM II compound, and
within easy reach of GoA offices, donors, and
IOs/NGOs.
Concerning office and logistics equipment,
UCAH relied almost entirely on UNAVEM and
UNDP during its first six months.8 The SRSG
arranged for UNAVEM to provide DHA with
office furniture and material, computers and
printers, phones and fax machines, and cars.
UNDP lent UCAH vehicles and walkie-talkies.
Without such support, it would have been impos-
sible for DHA’s office in Angola to function.9
Administration and Finance
The administration of UCAH’s personnel and
equipment was problematic during the unit’s first
two years. After some discussions on the different
ways in which to establish UCAH’s administra-
tive and financial links, it was decided that DHA
Geneva would manage UCAH and transfer
financial resources to the unit via UNDP Luanda
using the UN’s system of inter-office vouchers
(IOV). This system proved to be too slow given
the urgency of the situation in Angola. If UCAH
wanted to buy something locally, it could do so
only after asking DHA Geneva to ask UNDP to
issue a check to UCAH, with which the unit could
acquire the item. This sometimes took weeks, and
UCAH itself had little control over the process.
UNDP’s office in Luanda also handled the
hiring of UCAH’s Angolan personnel, thus
making many of the unit’s employees depend on
                                                
8 Two staff members used their personal computers
and one NGO lent UCAH a portable printer on several
occasions for negotiation missions to Huambo.
9 Throughout 1994, whenever UCAH placed a field
adviser in a province, such as Benguela, Huambo, or
Malange, the unit was rarely able to send the officers to
the field with the equipment they needed to perform
their jobs. Each of the field advisers had to rely on his
or her personal equipment or that of UN agencies and
NGOs, such as a car, a computer, a printer, or a
photocopier.
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the efficiency of the UNDP office. Similarly, DHA
did not hire UCAH’s expatriate personnel.
UNCTAD handled this in Geneva, thereby taking
away DHA’s control of the process. However,
UNCTAD performed quite well: It hired staff and
got them to the field in one month, fast by UN
standards.
During 1995, UCAH’s role in light of the peace
agreement expanded tremendously. UCAH
planned to hire and administer over 100 addi-
tional staff members to handle the coordination of
the mine action and the demobilisation and
reintegration programmes. Arrangements with
UNCTAD and UNDP were not working well
enough to cope with this challenge, so UCAH
decided to split the task in two. Some staff were
hired under existing procedures and others were
hired by the UN mission, UNAVEM III, on behalf
of UCAH. This arrangement made UCAH depen-
dent on UNAVEM III, which in turn relied on the
Field Administration and Logistics Division
(FALD) in New York. In sum, UCAH’s adminis-
trative ‘web’ included DHA and FALD in New
York, DHA and UNCTAD in Geneva, and
UNAVEM and UNDP in Luanda. These relations
were often time-consuming and complicated,
thereby putting tremendous strain on the staff
working for UCAH. This decreased their effec-
tiveness in dealing with the task at hand: complex
emergency coordination.
Administrative and Management Capacity
Despite working closely with DHA Geneva and
UNDP, UCAH itself compounded the administra-
tive and finance issue by not hiring a professional
to keep track of the unit’s administration and
finance. Rather, the unit relied on the experience
of one of its most senior employees and on the
hard work of three Angolan support staff. This
arrangement was unfair on the employees con-
cerned and insufficient for the unit’s needs: The
senior employee assigned the task of supervising
finance and administration was often detracted
from what he was actually hired to do, and the
support staff never had a full-time manager. In
January 1995, UCAH hired a staff member to
become the unit’s administrator, but the staff
member had no previous experience in the
United Nations and spoke neither English nor
Portuguese, the two most important languages
for the post in question.
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IV. HUMANITARIAN DIPLOMACY & ADVOCACY
Establishing Contact with the GoA in Luanda
and with UNITA in Huambo
The Angolan Government (GoA) welcomed the
establishment of a United Nations coordination
unit in April 1993. At the time, the government
had lost control of almost eighty percent of the
country to UNITA, and recognised that it was in
no position to coordinate emergency relief activi-
ties on behalf of the Angolan people. The UCAH
director adopted a policy of frequent consultation
with the GoA’s focal point for humanitarian assis-
tance, the Ministerio de Assistência e Reinserção
Social. (The ministry is known as MINARS and is
referred to in English as the Ministry of Social
Affairs). These consultations provided a forum
for government-UN discussion on humanitarian
affairs and enhanced information exchange on the
humanitarian situation between the two bodies.
An atmosphere of trust was established quickly,
perhaps because the UCAH director had been a
government minister in Mozambique when that
country experienced similar political and military
circumstances to those facing Angola in 1993.
Some doubts existed in the UN as to whether
or not UNITA would accept the UCAH director
given his previous links with the Mozambican
government, which could have been construed as
making him pro-MPLA, but UNITA never ques-
tioned this publicly or in any UN circles. Contact
with UNITA was more difficult to establish
because the party had no office in Luanda since
its expulsion from the city in November 1992.
UNITA’s leadership was in Angola’s second city,
Huambo, where the party established its head-
quarters after winning a fierce battle that raged
from January to March 1993. Huambo, however,
was inaccessible by road from Luanda and
despite constant UN, NGO, and ICRC requests to
gain access to the city by air either the GoA or
UNITA refused the requests during March, April,
and May. In June 1993, however, the ICRC
managed to send a four-person team to assess the
situation in the city and speak to a UNITA
delegation. Shortly thereafter, three NGOs
travelled to Huambo and in mid-June, the UCAH
director led the first UN mission to Huambo with
the purpose of establishing dialogue on
humanitarian affairs with UNITA.
This mission was vital to the United Nations
humanitarian effort for two reasons. First, there
was little chance of a cease-fire or return to peace
in the near future. In April 1993 just before UCAH
was established, the SRSG had brought the GoA
and UNITA together for the third time that year
to mediate a cease-fire and to re-establish the
peace process. This third meeting was held in
Abidjan and lasted some six weeks, after which
the talks broke down. Before the GoA returned to
Luanda and UNITA went to Huambo, UCAH
asked the SRSG to present both sides with an
emergency relief plan which would allow
humanitarian agencies to provide aid to needy
civilians. (See section V below). UCAH now
needed to get to Huambo to discuss humanitarian
affairs and the emergency relief plan with
UNITA. Second, the scale of the emergency was
already large but likely to get far bigger in the
near future. The war in Angola in early and mid-
1993 was decidedly different from previous wars
in the country in that it was urban. Cities housing
hundreds of thousands of Angolans were the sites
of devastating battles, or were besieged cutting
commercial ties and leaving residents unable to
go to their fields to cultivate. Consequently, the
number of Angolans suffering from inhumane
conditions was far greater than at any previous
time in the country’s history.
Negotiating Aid with the GoA and UNITA
During the civil war, UCAH dealt with the GoA
and UNITA separately, explaining to both sides
that the unit was not a mediator to bring the two
sides together. UCAH aimed to discuss humani-
tarian issues with both sides in order to facilitate
the speedy and effective delivery of aid to
civilians in need, wherever they might be.
Humanitarian issues were on the agenda of
neither the GoA nor UNITA in mid-1993. Political
and military issues occupied the time of both.
However, the establishment of UCAH made both
sides to the conflict more aware that their violent
actions bore heavily on the population, which
was suffering as it had never done so before.
To highlight the Angolans’ plight, UCAH
assembled the available information and calcu-
lated that 1,000 Angolans were dying daily as a
direct consequence of the war. This figure, which
was initially accepted with some scepticism but
upon explanation gained widespread credibility,
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was perhaps the most critical factor in putting
humanitarian issues on the agenda of policy
makers. Suddenly, humanitarian concerns were
raised on the two main nation-wide radio net-
works, Radio Nacional de Angola and Voz do Galo
Negro (Vorgan), and in the pro-government daily,
Jornal de Angola, and UNITA’s monthly
publication, Terra Angolana.
Developing Principles for Humanitarian
Programmes
Once the GoA and UNITA understood UCAH’s
role and were conscious of the scope of Angola’s
humanitarian disaster, UCAH concentrated on
discussing conditions of work with both sides.
This discussion was particularly necessary with
UNITA as the party controlled the majority of
Angolan territory. After consulting UN agencies
and NGOs to establish common concerns on the
conditions of work, UCAH explained to the GoA
and UNITA that aid agencies had certain expecta-
tions that would have to be agreed to before any
operations could succeed. These expectations
included:
– the neutrality of humanitarian assistance,
which would be made available to those in
need and should not serve military purposes;
– guarantees on the safety and security of
humanitarian personnel and property;
– needs assessments as a basis for humanitarian
programmes;
– freedom of movement of humanitarian person-
nel and their goods; and
– freedom for humanitarian personnel to com-
municate with Angolans.
UCAH negotiated humanitarian issues on behalf
of the humanitarian cause and spoke about con-
cerns and expectations of aid agencies on the
whole. UCAH never mentioned any particular
aid agency by name unless a UN agency or NGO
asked the unit to do so on a precise issue, i.e.
UCAH did not speak on behalf of an agency,
rather for a collective cause. This approach
became increasingly appropriate throughout 1993
as working relations between UN agencies and
NGOs tightened. Two organisations, Medecins
sans Frontières-France and the International
Committee of the Red Cross, asked UCAH to
mention to the GoA and UNITA that MSF and the
ICRC were independent of UCAH. The two
organisations maintained separate, individual
contacts with the GoA and UNITA.10
The main issue concerning humanitarian
organisations following the renewal of fighting
was access to civilians. Aid workers had little
information from the provincial capitals, where
fighting had been fierce. UN agency and NGO
staff assumed that civilians were in need of assis-
tance; but it was impossible to know how many
people were suffering and what their needs were
without going to each province to assess the sit-
uation. To tackle the issue, UCAH and the UN
agencies presented the GoA and UNITA with a
plan of action, known as the Emergency Relief
Plan, in late May. The plan was approved shortly
thereafter, although it faltered almost
immediately because of an issue which would
arise frequently until the end of the war in
November 1994: linkage. (See section V below).
1993 and 1994 Linkage
Humanitarian negotiations with the GoA were
reasonably straightforward. The government
committed itself to the concept that aid should be
provided to any Angolans who were suffering.
UNITA’s leadership explained that it wanted all
Angolans to receive aid. That is, one side agreed
to the concept that all Angolans in need should
receive assistance while the other side wanted all
Angolans to be provided aid.
In mid-1993, the humanitarian situation in
four provincial capitals was of particular concern.
In two, Huambo and Kuito, major battles had
affected hundreds of thousands of people and
devastated the infrastructure. While Huambo had
witnessed a fierce battle, known as the ‘fifty-five
days’, it was not under siege. Government troops
fled to the coast upon losing control of the city.
UNITA occupied Huambo and all of the sur-
rounding countryside. Residents could access
areas outside the city and therefore had some
means with which to survive. No aid organisa-
tions had visited Kuito since late 1992, but daily
reports via high frequency (HF) radio from
Angolan staff in the city indicated that the situa-
tion there was disastrous. Two other provincial
capitals, Malange and Menongue, were besieged
by UNITA. In both cities, the population had no
access to the fields around the towns and was
slowly starving.
                                                
10 Nevertheless, the UCAH director and head of
ICRC’s delegation met weekly to share information on
their own respective negotiations with both sides.
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To start humanitarian operations in these four
and other areas of Angola, the UN sought the
agreement of the GoA and UNITA. Both sides
agreed, in principle, although UNITA cited secu-
rity problems affecting Kuito, Malange, and
Menongue and did not think that humanitarian
operations could take place safely in the cities.
After much discussion between the UN and
UNITA, the party agreed that humanitarian pro-
grammes start in Kuito but stressed that Huambo
must receive aid, too. In other words, UNITA set
the precedent in mid-1993 of linking aid for one
city’s population to that of another city’s, based
on the premise that if Angolans in a government
area received aid, then Angolans in a UNITA area
had to be provided assistance, too.
Once UNITA had set the precedent of linkage,
the GoA adopted the strategy as well; although it
used a different argument. For example, the GoA
explained that fierce fighting had taken place in
Kuito for months. GoA, UN, and NGO reports
from the city highlighted the terrible suffering
there. If the citizens of Kuito, who were clearly
more in need of humanitarian assistance than any
other Angolans, could not get it, then no
Angolans should.
Linking one city to another and paralysing aid
operations based on whether or not one city got
assistance had disastrous effects on the suffering
populations caught in any of the ‘linked’ areas.
UCAH confronted this situation throughout
much of 1993 by stressing to both sides that
people in need had the right to receive assistance.
UCAH explained that requiring similar amounts
of aid to go to government and UNITA zones was
a political argument. The distribution of aid, the
unit explained, would be justified on
humanitarian grounds, not political considera-
tions.
Such discussions were complex and required
concerted action. Given UCAH’s position as a
support structure to the SRSG, the unit often
tapped on his discussing humanitarian issues
with the GoA and UNITA. At times, the SRSG
called on the Secretary-General himself to
intervene when humanitarian negotiations
reached a stalemate. In addition, UCAH’s close
links to donors and NGOs permitted other actors
to approach the sides in the conflict with the same
message. In sum, much pressure was exerted on
both sides to cooperate with the humanitarian
programme.
Working with UNITA within a Sanctions
Regime
During 1993, several countries and the Security
Council called on UNITA to stop fighting and
return to the peace process. UNITA was held
accountable for re-starting the conflict and creat-
ing the humanitarian disaster which had assumed
catastrophic proportions. On 15 September 1993,
the Security Council issued Resolution 864. Citing
Chapter VII of the UN Charter the Council
decided that all States should prevent the sale or
supply of weapons, ammunition and military
equipment as well as petroleum products to any
territory in Angola not controlled by the Gov-
ernment of Angola.
The Security Council sanctions did not limit
the ability of UNITA’s war machine to function.
In terms of arms acquisitions or having enough
petroleum products to run its army, sanctions did
not make UNITA suffer.11 However, Security
Council sanctions did have a political and
psychological effect on the party. Sanctions
confirmed the international community’s view
that UNITA was to blame for the breakdown of
the Bicesse Accords and the renewed fighting,
with its consequences for the Angolan
population. Sanctions diminished UNITA’s
political clout amongst its followers and
confirmed, in the minds of its enemies, that the
international community blamed UNITA for
Angola’s predicament. Psychologically, this bore
heavily on the UNITA leadership, which
complained that sanctions had been imposed on a
party, as opposed to a government, and that this
was unfair.
UCAH never raised the matter of sanctions
with UNITA. The party brought up the issues fre-
quently, complaining that the party had been
singled out and blamed for a problem which it
did not cause. At such times, UCAH
representatives (principally the director and
during 1994 the Huambo field adviser) listened to
UNITA and explained that the UN had different
departments each of which had specific roles:
DHA or UCAH’s was to facilitate humanitarian
assistance. After several such incidents, UNITA
no longer raised the its concerns over sanctions
with UCAH; perhaps the party understood that
such discussion was better held with the SRSG or
UNAVEM.
                                                
11 Human Rights Watch, Angola: Arms Trade and
Violations of the Laws of War since the 1992 Elections, p.
47–58.
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V. HUMANITARIAN POLICY & STRATEGIES
The Sanctity of Aid1 2
The point put across most strongly by UCAH
throughout its first two years was that humanitar-
ian issues should be considered on their own
merit. While it was necessary to place the
humanitarian situation within a wider, and hence,
political context one should not create
humanitarian policy or carry out humanitarian
programmes based on political or military
considerations or influences. UN agencies,
donors, NGOs, and the ICRC welcomed and
endorsed this approach; although some
organisations questioned UCAH’s capacity to
stay apolitical given that it was part of DHA, a
department of the UN Secretariat.
UCAH’s insistence on maintaining humanitar-
ian issues separate from political and military
considerations and influences enabled it to main-
tain its credibility with the GoA and UNITA, and,
of course, with humanitarian agencies. It also
provided the humanitarian assistance programme
with a safeguard: if the political process worsened
or the military situation deteriorated, UCAH’s
access to decision makers would be assured as its
purpose was to further the humanitarian cause in
a non-partisan, apolitical framework.
Relief, Rehabilitation, and Development
A second pillar for the establishment of humani-
tarian policy was the principle that emergency
relief activities be addressed context of Angola’s
eventual rehabilitation and development. UCAH
did not subscribe to a linear continuum theory,
which stressed the end of the ‘emergency’ and the
beginning of ‘rehabilitation’, which would then
move into ‘development’. (Many of Angola’s
provinces had the three different activities occur-
ring simultaneously). The key, as far as UCAH
was concerned, was that emergency activities
were an essential, not necessarily the essential,
component in a much wider scope of humanitar-
                                                
12 UNICEF seconded a senior staff member to UCAH,
which employed him as a policy adviser. His more
than twenty years development experience working for
NGOs in Canada and Southern Africa provided UCAH
with an invaluable ‘think-tank’ capacity, thereby
supporting the unit’s director to analyse humanitarian
affairs and propose appropriate policies and strategies.
This role greatly enhanced UCAH’s credibility vis-à-vis
the donors, UN agencies, and IOs/NGOs.
ian action, which included simultaneous emer-
gency, rehabilitation, and development activities.
Consolidating the Strengths of UN Agencies
and NGOs
In Angola, the challenge of implementing
humanitarian programmes when resources were
very scarce called for agencies to consolidate their
programmes and avoid duplication of effort.
Upon its establishment, UCAH met UN agencies
and NGOs working in Angola to discuss
humanitarian assistance. The first step was to
ascertain the type of activities in which respective
organisations were or planned to be involved.
This led to thorough discussion on the roles and
responsibilities that different types of
organisations could assume. UN agencies and
NGOs quickly agreed that the UN agencies’
logistic and technical capabilities should be
combined with the expertise of the field-based
personnel of Angolan and expatriate NGOs. The
UN agencies could be responsible for ‘macro’
issues, such as logistics or security, while the
NGOs tackled ‘micro’ issues, such as the
distribution of food in cities and towns.13
Amongst UN agencies, agreement was reached
on the following distribution of responsibilities:
– logistics would be undertaken by WFP, which
would transport UN and NGO equipment,
property, personnel, and programme inputs by
air or road to the provinces;
– food Aid would be cleared through Angola’s
three main ports, stored in warehouses, and
delivered to primary distribution points, i.e.
provincial capitals, by WFP;
– nation-wide HF and Telex-over-Radio Com-
munications would be managed by UNDP with
support from UCAH;
– security for humanitarian staff and property
would be monitored by UCAH;
– non-food Sector Provincial Offices would be
established by UNICEF; and
– resource Mobilization was the responsibility of
each agency involved in the relief effort;
                                                
13 This discussion was supported by a group of key
NGOs, brought together by the International Medical
Corps and SCF-UK, which wrote a paper “NGO Emop
Strategy” and shared it with UCAH.
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although UCAH promoted it by organising the
preparation and launching of four consolidated
inter-agency appeals from April 1993 to Febru-
ary 1995. (See section VIII below).
Defining roles and responsibilities by sector,
rather than by social group, enabled UN agencies
to know precisely where their responsibilities lay
and helped build a sense of collaboration, rather
than competition, between the different UN agen-
cies.
In addition to nation-wide UN agency-NGO
collaboration, the four MSF sections and the ICRC
launched their own respective humanitarian
programmes throughout Angola. While these
activities were not part of the integrated UN
agency-NGO strategy, UCAH promoted informa-
tion exchange between all actors to avoid dupli-
cation of effort.
The Emergency Relief Plan
From November 1992 to April 1993, the UN
agencies’ approach to humanitarian operations
was ad hoc. The UN did not have a policy for
humanitarian operations. There was no serious
discussion between the UN agencies on which
way to approach the GoA and UNITA. WFP had
a several cargo aeroplanes in Luanda and had
flown cargo to some destinations under govern-
ment control but this was not done
systematically. UNHCR had bought some hours
from a commercial cargo company and flew to
the northern provinces of Uige and Zaire, both
under UNITA control, and to two eastern
provinces under government control. Yet, there
was little or no institutional discussion on an
overall UN agency response to the crisis.
Upon UCAH’s establishment, the UN agencies
found a place in which joint policies and strate-
gies could be discussed. The first operational plan
which the agencies elaborated was known as the
Emergency Plan for Humanitarian Assistance,
later modified and referred to as the Emergency
Relief Plan. Initially, it highlighted reaching four
areas by road and ten by air. Each road or air
corridor would be used on one, two, or three des-
ignated days per week. On such days, ‘Both
parties agreed not to take any military advantages
from humanitarian operations...road and air cor-
ridors will be utilised during the agreed days of
the week only for relief assistance under the UN
umbrella’.
The Emergency Relief Plan was handed to
both sides to the conflict on 26 May 1993, at the
end of the Abidjan peace talks. The GoA and
UNITA accepted the plan during the first week of
June, although UNITA suggested the inclusion of
several additional corridors and cited difficulties
in reaching some of the destinations because of
logistic and security constraints. Among the cities
that could not be reached were Kuito, Malange,
and Menongue, three of the four cities harbouring
the worst humanitarian situations.
The government agreed that the plan begin on
21 June but stressed that access to Kuito would be
necessary to ensure success. UCAH went to
Huambo for further negotiations on the same day
to discuss access to Kuito and possible air drop-
ping operations to Malange and Menongue, but
UNITA reiterated that access was impossible
because of damaged landing strips.
Consequently, the government cancelled the
plan’s continuation explaining that, those
Angolans most in need, the people of Kuito,
should get aid as soon as any other Angolans.
The Emergency Relief Plan started again on 15
July 1993, after UCAH had held a series of meet-
ings with UNITA and gained the party’s accep-
tance of aid flights to Malange and Menongue.
However, two events, which put an end to the
plan, occurred on the same day. First, the UN had
gained the agreement of both sides to fly to Kuito
by helicopter. The flight had to take place via
Huambo for logistics reasons. Upon arrival in
Huambo, however, UNITA called a meeting with
the UN team and announced that the mission
should not proceed to Kuito because of intense
fighting in the city. (UCAH later received inde-
pendent confirmation that this was the case).
Second, a UN agency flight to the capital of Zaire
province, M’Banza Congo, was shot as it
approached the runway. (UNITA later accepted
responsibility for the incident). Based on the
second event, which put into question the
security of aid workers and their property, the
UN stopped the Emergency Relief Plan.
The response to the plan demonstrated that
four cities, Huambo, Kuito, Malange, and
Menongue, were particularly sensitive to the GoA
and UNITA, and that their influence on the plan’s
success or failure was enormous. In light of this,
UCAH (in consultation with the SRSG, UN agen-
cies, and IOs/NGOs) decided to divide the plan’s
destinations into two groups: non-active con flict
and active-conflict. Negotiations on access to
areas included in the plan were henceforth split in
two in the hope that access would be available to
non-active conflict zones while discussions con-
tinued on active conflict zones. However, just
after UCAH proposed the amended plan to both
sides, the GoA launched a six-week air attack on
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the city of Huambo. One effect of this was that
UCAH’s communication links with UNITA were
cut. The SRSG managed to arrange a meeting
between UCAH and UNITA in Kinshasa, Zaire,
on 23 August 1993, and on 3 September 1993 the
party accepted flights to proceed to ‘non-active
conflict’ zones.
In light of the delays caused in implementing
the Emergency Relief Plan, UCAH discussed dif-
ferent ways in which to get aid to those in need in
areas that it deemed safe. At the same time,
Caritas Internationalis managed to gain the con-
sent of both sides to fly its own relief
commodities to some cities around the country in
which no fighting was taking place.14 Further,
two NGOs hired a commercial cargo company to
fly aid to a handful of provincial capitals.
Consequently, UCAH encouraged collaboration
between UN agencies and Caritas, and between
UN agencies and the concerned NGOs to arrange
for UNICEF and WFP relief commodities to reach
key, non-conflict cities. This approach lasted
throughout August and part of September 1993
and was indicative of the growing collaboration
between UN agencies and NGOs.
                                                
14 Caritas had its own HF radio network throughout
Angola and could provide aid via the Catholic church.
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VI. MAIN FEATURES OF COORDINATION
Information Exchange
Facilitating information exchange between all
actors involved in emergency relief activities in
Angola and providing a global view of
humanitarian issues was one of UCAH’s most
important functions. During 1993, the unit
worked to establish itself as a focal point where
information could be gathered, synthesised, and
disseminated. The lack of an information officer
during 1993, however, hindered the unit’s ability
to develop many of the ideas that it had to
produce and disseminate useful information.
With the arrival of a full-time information officer
in December 1993, UCAH increased its
production of written information, much of which
was disseminated to the GoA, UNITA, donors,
UN agencies, IOs and NGOs.
– Information Bulletins, written weekly to inform
readers of the main events related to
humanitarian assistance and of humanitarian
programmes being implemented in different
parts of the country;
– briefing notes on key cities and provinces avail-
able to the all humanitarian actors and the
press;
– field trip reports prepared by UCAH staff
members whenever they travelled outside
Luanda. These reports were often distributed
to key donors, UN agencies, and NGOs
working in the area of concern;
– situation reports sometimes prepared by
UCAH’s field advisers and disseminated to
donors and humanitarian organisations work-
ing in the province under review;
– needs assessment reports of assessments led and
organised by UCAH written and disseminated
to donors, participants, UN agencies, and
NGOs concerned;
– provincial files including public information
produced by humanitarian organisations kept
at UCAH for public consumption; and
– special reports on sectoral issues such as agri-
culture or nutrition written to highlight special
programmes and outstanding needs.
UCAH produced few in-depth analyses of
humanitarian issues in Angola. While this was
always a concern of the unit, the lack of resources
prevented it from carrying out this role.15 How-
ever, considerable verbal analysis of the available
information took place at meetings which the unit
promoted.
Finally, UCAH concentrated on disseminating
information about the humanitarian crisis in
Angola to the national and international media.
Such dissemination often highlighted the positive
impact of the humanitarian programmes under-
way. While Angola’s crisis was often referred to
as the ‘forgotten war’ UCAH’s relations with the
press, especially during 1994, captured the media
interest that existed and promoted the work of
UN agencies and NGOs alike.
Maintaining Relations with the GoA
and UNITA
Concerning actual contacts with the two sides, it
was agreed that each agency, whether UN or
NGO, was responsible for discussing the opera-
tional details of its particular programme with the
GoA and UNITA, or only with the government if
the programme was in a government-controlled
area. UCAH and the UN agencies most involved
in the emergency (UNHCR, UNICEF, and WFP)
maintained close contact with the Ministry of
Social Affairs in Luanda, which was easily acces-
sible for consultation. UCAH’s frequent contacts
with the ministry concentrated on the global
aspects of humanitarian operations while the UN
agencies sometimes went to the ministry individ-
ually to explain more programme-specific details.
As illustrated above, communication with
UNITA was complicated during 1993 and 1994 by
the party’s location far from the capital. UCAH
held negotiations with UNITA in Huambo on
several occasions during June and July 1993.
UNICEF and WFP often joined UCAH to promote
a consolidated UN agency position. This process
was interrupted during August and September
1993 because it was impossible to get to the city,
but contact was re-established in Huambo in
October and consolidated in November and
December. In January 1994, UCAH placed a full-
                                                
15 A notable exception was the unit’s demobilisation
and reintegration office, which hired anthropologists
and sociologists familiar with Angola to carry out
several thorough studies, such as the socio-economic
expectations of demobilised soldiers.
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time representative in Huambo to facilitate
communication with the party. This process
continued uninterrupted, except for six weeks in
mid-1994, until UNITA lost control of the city of
Huambo in November of that year.
Coordinating with UN Agencies
Seven UN agencies (UNDP, UNFAO, UNFPA,
UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP, WHO) worked in
Angola when UCAH was established. Most
agency representatives cited the need for a
coordination unit to help the UN agencies
establish common policies and better integrate
their programmes. UN agency heads expressed
the concern that UCAH not create an additional
layer of bureaucracy, with which agencies would
have to work. One agency head was quite wary of
the establishment of a coordination unit and
asked that it not tell agencies what to do but
enhance their programmes.16
Throughout its first two years, UCAH pro-
vided UN agencies with a regular forum in which
to discuss issues related to policy and
programme. For example, within a few weeks of
UCAH’s establishment, UN agencies had reached
agreement on a major division of roles and
responsibilities (see section V above). UCAH
promoted daily, informal consultations between
UN agency heads and held formal meetings each
week. Discussions included everything from
quotidian operational issues to how to approach
donors to raise programme resources.
Establishing and Maintaining Relations with
Donors
UCAH invited donors to a meeting during the
unit’s first week. When asked about coordination
of humanitarian assistance and whether or not
donors had their own coordination mechanism to
discuss humanitarian issues, two of the main
donors answered ‘ad hoc’ and ‘You're it’. Donors
expressed their hope that UCAH facilitate
coordination amongst all actors.
The UCAH director, supported by the donor
liaison officer, started a number of activities to
foment strong relations between the donor com-
munity and UN agencies and IOs/NGOs. These
included:
– weekly meetings held at UCAH where the unit
briefed donors on overall humanitarian issues
and UN agencies explained their ongoing pro-
                                                
16   The representative actually said in a meeting that
the unit should consist only of the director and one
secretary!
grammes. (UCAH proposed that IOs and
NGOs be allowed to attend these meetings. The
proposal was accepted for the ICRC but not for
NGOs). UCAH wrote notes for the file of these
meetings and sent them to donors the
following day;
– individual consultations and briefings with donors
to address specific issues or provide
humanitarian briefings;
– donor participation in assessments, organised by
UCAH;
– field trips to the provinces, to show and explain
the humanitarian situation to donors or delega-
tions from outside Angola;
– specific resource mobilisation to ask donors for
agency programme support.
Humanitarian assistance programmes received
strong financial and in-kind support from the
donors throughout 1993 and 1994. Moreover,
UCAH’s attention to building strong relations
with donors by organising the actions cited
above, encouraged donors to interact more
amongst themselves. For example, four of the key
donors (ECHO, Sweden, UK, and USA) met
monthly to share information on which UN
agency and NGO programmes they planned to
support.
Working with NGOs
Throughout much of 1991 and 1992, relations
between UN agencies and NGOs were awkward.
NGOs felt that some UN agencies, especially
UNDP, behaved in a paternal and generally
haughty manner towards them. For example,
SRPA appeal preparations did not include discus-
sions with NGOs despite the document being
littered with activities that the NGOs were to
undertake for UN agencies. There were, of course,
exceptions but the overall relationship between
UN agencies and NGOs was not good.
UCAH’s establishment in April 1993 provided
an opportunity to enhance UN agency-NGO rela-
tions. UCAH seized the opportunity in several,
straightforward ways. First, UCAH explained its
role to the NGO community and told NGO rep-
resentatives that the unit had no authority over or
institutional link to any NGOs. Second, UCAH
invited NGOs to establish open and frank dia-
logue with the unit so that policy or operational
issues could be addressed. Third, UCAH told
NGOs that it wanted strong relations between
UN agencies and NGOs and that ways in which
to pursue this should be discussed. Fourth,
UCAH assured NGOs that the unit would not
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make assumptions about NGO plans or
programmes without first consulting them. Fifth,
UCAH promised to support NGOs, as
appropriate, if they had issues to resolve with UN
agencies. Sixth, UCAH offered to back NGO fund
raising efforts in general terms by including them
in the appeal process (see section VIII below).
Throughout UCAH’s first two years, the unit
invited NGOs to participate in almost all facets of
its work thereby building a spirit of collaboration
and trust between the UN and NGOs. NGOs
themselves, of course, contributed to the process
enormously. First, while NGOs lacked a strong
coordination body of their own, they showed an
interest and willingness in building constructive
working relations with UCAH and UN agencies,
such as WFP.17 Second, the representatives of
important Angolan and expatriate NGOs such as
ADRA, Oikos, SCAM, SCF-UK, and World Vision
International, worked to encourage all non-
governmental humanitarian organisations to
participate in the framework which was estab-
lished.
Some examples UCAH’s actions vis-à-vis
NGOs are given below:
– letter of affiliation: A letter of understanding
between the United Nations in Angola and any
NGO which chose to sign the letter. It helped to
foster a spirit of collaboration and clarified
what NGOs could expect from the UN, e.g.
flight support, communications frequencies
and identity cards;
– strategy sessions to discuss relevant programme
issues;
– information sharing sessions  to provide UN
agencies and NGOs a forum in which informa-
tion could be shared and announcements and
plans could be made;
– communications and flight support provided to
affiliated NGOs, who could use UN HF and
UHF radio frequencies, and get free air trans-
port for humanitarian personnel to and from
the provinces; and
– security meetings and support: During 1993 and
1994, the absence of UNAVEM II observers in
almost all of Angola’s interior led to UN
agencies and NGOs seeking UCAH’s support
to monitor the security situation as it related to
humanitarian operations, to keep UN agencies
and NGOs informed of the situation, and to
                                                
17 Two NGO co-ordination bodies existed at the time
but neither were particularly effective. The Forum das
ONGs Angolanas, known as FONGA, included Angolan
NGOs and the Confederação de ONGs em Angola,
known as CONGA, included Angolan and expatriate
NGOs.
organise evacuations, when necessary. (See
section IX below).
– pigeon holes at UCAH for all NGOs working in
Angola so that they could receive information
from the unit and send information to each
other in a cost-effective way.
Assessing Needs
Much discussion took place among UN agencies
in Angola to decide who should lead and
organise needs assessments. It was agreed that
the task should go to UCAH because the process
was considered a coordination function, which
should be led by an agency that did not
implement projects.
UCAH called on the GoA and UNITA to alert
the unit of areas where a population’s needs were
acute. When an area was identified, UCAH or-
ganised a team to visit the area. Assessment
teams aimed to include government or UNITA
officials, donors, UN agencies, and Angolan and
international NGOs. During the war, it was
impossible for GoA or UNITA members or
virtually any Angolans to move from a
government zone to a UNITA area, or vice-versa.
This changed after the peace agreement, known
as the Lusaka Protocol, was signed on 20
November 1994. Shortly thereafter, GoA and
UNITA members and Angolans working for
humanitarian organisations crossed former front-
lines to help evaluate needs.
Assessments were followed by meetings to
organise quick inter-agency responses to the
needs that were identified. After consultation
with the participants, UCAH wrote needs
assessment reports according to its own format
and distributed them to the GoA, UNITA, donors,
UN agencies, and NGOs. However, individual
UN agency assessment reports sometimes ‘told a
different story’ which led to conflicting
programme recommendations. This might have
been averted if agencies had used the same
format during needs assessments. Standard
formats also would have allowed agencies to
allocate scarce resources more efficiently,
according to priority needs. In March 1995, the
Humanitarian Coordination Group started
developing a format that could be used by
agencies during assessments and it was expected
that this would help to resolve the issue.
Field Advisers
Since its establishment, UCAH stressed the need
to have representatives or field coordinators at
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the provincial level. However, this idea worried
UN agencies, who were concerned that UCAH
would become operational. Donors and NGOs
agreed with UCAH and by late 1993, when access
had been gained to most of the country and relief
activities were expanding, UN agencies agreed
that UCAH have a presence in the field on a tem-
porary basis.
The first area to have an UCAH field adviser
was Huambo. UCAH needed daily contact with
UNITA as humanitarian operations could not
take place nation-wide without it. Flying from
Luanda to Huambo each time discussions on a
particular issue were necessary was not always
possible. In addition, the humanitarian pro-
gramme in Huambo was expanding. UCAH was
called on to facilitate the coordination of the effort
and to monitor the security situation.
In addition to the Huambo field adviser, dur-
ing 1994 UCAH placed field advisers in Benguela,
Kwando Kubango, and Malange. Further, one
officer in Luanda was dispatched to the field, as
necessary. The standard functions of field
advisers were to:
– represent the UCAH director at the provincial
level;
– work closely with the GoA or UNITA, UN
agencies, and IOs/NGOs to facilitate coordi-
nated relief activities;
– facilitate information exchange by gathering,
synthesising, and disseminating briefing notes
and reports on the humanitarian situation;
– monitor the humanitarian situation and bring
to light programme gaps and areas of unmet
needs;
– lead and organise assessment missions;
– monitor the security situation and take
measures as appropriate;
– ensure that UHF, HF, and telex-over-radio
works were available to UN agencies and
NGOs in the field; and
– organise field visits for donors and journalists.
The field adviser system was useful and worked,
although UCAH’s efforts to place the staff in the
field quickly were hampered by two issues. First,
donors were slow to deposit funds in the appro-
priate accounts. Second, it was difficult for UCAH
to find qualified candidates, who spoke
Portuguese.
Coordination in Times of Peace
In February 1994, it looked increasingly likely that
the peace talks under way in the Zambian capital,
Lusaka, would soon bear fruit. UCAH
highlighted the need for the UN agencies and
NGOs to be fully prepared to confront humani-
tarian needs. UCAH sought donor support and
hired staff so that the unit and agencies in the
country would be ready to address the changing
reality when the war ended. Upon peace, there
would be three programme areas, supported by
UCAH’s policy section:
– Emergency relief, resettlement, and rehabilita-
tion: This section would concentrate on
UCAH’s role of coordinating the relief opera-
tion bearing in mind three issues. First, emer-
gency relief activities were likely to expand
after a peace agreement because of increased
access to towns and villages across the country.
Second, internally displaced people and
refugees were likely to return to their place of
origin, and this programme would need careful
coordination and synchronisation between the
various actors. Third, as the peace process con-
solidated, emergency activities would diminish
and rehabilitation work would most likely
expand;
– Mine action, i.e. mine awareness, survey, clear-
ing, and training: Angola, similar to
Afghanistan, Cambodia, and Mozambique,
was burdened with millions of mines through-
out the country resulting in one of the highest
‘amputee per capita’ rates in the world. A con-
certed effort to address this issue would be nec-
essary in post-war Angola. UCAH opened a
Central Mine Action Office (UCAH-CMAO) to
plan and coordinate the thee-pronged strategy
of mine awareness, survey, and clearance,
which included training for Angolans to
assume these tasks. United Nations experience
outside Angola emphasised the use of local
staff for mine clearing. This staff would benefit
from training and special equipment. The
resulting transfer of knowledge from spe-
cialised UN agencies and NGOs to citizens of
the country in question would help to form the
nucleus of a national mine capacity. Given the
long time that would be needed to resolve the
mine problem in Angola, UCAH proposed that
a national institute for mine action be estab-
lished to coordinate mine action throughout
the country. (See section X below);
– Demobilisation and socio-economic reintegra-
tion of former combatants: The success of the
peace agreement in Angola would hinge on the
demobilisation and social reintegration of
former combatants. To tackle this task, UNDP
collaborated with UCAH by hiring a consultant
to review and analyse the Angolan demobilisa-
tion experience under the auspices of the
Bicesse Accords. In May 1994, UCAH hired
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four consultants with demobilisation and rein-
tegration experience in El Salvador and
Mozambique. These consultants formed the
embryo of what was later to become UCAH’s
Demobilisation and Reintegration Office
(UCAH-DRO).
During the second half of 1994, UCAH-DRO
sought extensive consultations with the GoA and
UNITA, and carried out a series of studies, such
as the social and economic expectations of demo-
bilising soldiers. Several planning sessions were
held with UNAVEM, UN agencies, and NGOs, to
prepare appropriate programme options. Similar
to the mine action programme, UCAH-DRO
stressed the need to create an independent
Angolan institute for demobilisation and reinte-
gration, which would take on overall manage
ment of the programme. (See section X below).
Given the way in which the Angolan conflict
had erupted in late 1992, the GoA and UNITA
were very suspicious of each other. This compli-
cated UCAH-DRO’s task, and often led to delays
in gaining access to one side or the other and in
obtaining information necessary to elaborate the
programme. The situation became particularly
frustrating in early-1995, when the GoA and
UNITA began to renegotiate the way in which
troop demobilisation was to be conducted. These
negotiations culminated in both sides agreeing to
a concept termed ‘Global Incorporation’, which
differed from the method originally envisaged.
This change in tactic led to the necessary revision
of the plans as they stood in March 1995. How-
ever, the establishment of UCAH-DRO almost
one year earlier had allowed the UN to collect
and analyse a wealth of information, as well as
discuss it with all necessary partners, and this
could only strengthen the chances for a successful
programme.
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VII. SPECIAL COORDINATION MECHANISMS
TO ENHANCE OPERATIONS
The ASDI–UCAH Mechanism
During 1993, the Swedish International Devel-
opment Authority (known in Angola by its Por-
tuguese acronym, ASDI) wanted to fund NGO
emergency relief activities. However, ASDI did
not have the staff to receive, evaluate, and rec-
ommend NGO proposals for support. Further,
ASDI was constrained by its bilateral agreement
with the GoA which stipulated that the agency
could support only Angolan or Swedish NGOs.
After discussion with the GoA, which agreed to
ASDI’s proposal to fund NGOs that were not
Angolan or Swedish, the agency approached
UCAH so that together they could back NGOs
working to alleviate human suffering. ASDI and
UCAH created an arrangement known as the
ASDI-UCAH Mechanism (AUM). It functioned in
the following way:
– NGOs wrote emergency project proposals,
following a simple format that was discussed
and agreed to, for health, logistics, nutrition,
and water and sanitation (and, later, support
for street children) projects;
– during the first two weeks of each month,
NGOs sent proposals to UCAH which analysed
them with support from a UN technical review
committee comprising members from UNDP,
UNICEF, WFP, and WHO;
– UCAH and the UN technical review committee
recommended to ASDI which proposals should
receive financial support;
– ASDI approved UCAH’s recommendations
and arranged for project funds to be
transferred directly from Stockholm to
respective NGO headquarters;
– UCAH assumed responsibility for monitoring
NGO project implementation, and ASDI
remained responsible for tracking project
finances; and
– NGOs sent quarterly reports and financial
reports to UCAH, which reviewed them and
forwarded them to ASDI.
From October 1993 to April 1995, UCAH received
140 NGO proposals. These were reviewed by
UCAH and the UN technical review team, and
together they recommended 52 or 37% for full or
partial funding. During the AUM’s second phase,
which allowed direct funding to Angolan NGOs,
38% of the fund recipients where Angolan NGOs.
Over US$ 6 million was disbursed through this
fund and proposals were reviewed and approved or
rejected in seven days.
Project distribution by sector was wide
although the health and nutrition sectors were
most often represented. The majority of the pro-
jects were implemented in besieged cities, where
there were virtually no basic services. A
collaborative spirit existed between the donor
(ASDI), the mechanism’s manager (UCAH), the
UN technical review team and non-governmental
organisations. Project proposals and reports were
kept simple yet comprehensive to enable NGOs
to concentrate their efforts on project implemen-
tation while UCAH and ASDI monitored
programme activities. In sum, the AUM was a
powerful tool that enhanced UCAH’s role
because it gave the unit the means with which to
encourage NGOs to work in the areas with the
most critical needs.
The Seeds and Tools Working Group
Another mechanism which greatly enhanced
coordination of the humanitarian programme in
Angola was UCAH’s seeds and tools working
group. This group was based in Luanda and com-
prised members of the GoA, donors, UN
agencies, and IOs/NGOs.18 Each month,
members met to analyse the needs for Angola’s
two planting seasons and agree on roles and
responsibilities of the various actors. (Angola has
two planting seasons, one main season known as
the lavras and one secondary season known as the
nacas). Meetings provided the opportunity for
interested parties to communicate with each
other, and come to decisions on the allocation of
available resources. This included:
– The GoA’s Ministry of Agriculture being
closely involved with UN agency and IO/NGO
activities throughout the country even the min-
istry was not represented nation-wide;
– Donors working together to inform each other
of the seeds and tools resources to be made
available; and
                                                
18 Starting in January 1995, UNITA also participated
in Luanda.
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– UN agencies and IOs/NGOs sharing informa-
tion on their assessment of needs for seeds and
tools by province.
The seeds and tools working group demonstrated
UCAH’s concern that the provision of emergency
relief items, especially food aid, not become an
end in itself, and that Angolans be supported in
their desire to maintain their own agriculture
production, wherever possible.
Provincial Meetings
During UCAH’s first two years, the unit organ
ised and led meetings that addresses issues in
specific provinces. (Ideally, these meetings would
have taken place in the provinces themselves, but
often this was not possible because of UCAH’s
lack of staff). UN agencies and IOs/NGOs were
invited to participate in these meetings, which
were held to allow humanitarian organisations to
assess, plan, monitor, and evaluate future and
ongoing programmes. UCAH thus provided ope-
rational agencies a forum in which programme
issues could be discussed. (Donors sometimes
attended these meetings, too). At times, UCAH
used these fora to discuss security issues, inclu-
ding the need for evacuations, but the thrust of
the initiate was to address humanitarian pro-
grammes. At different times during 1993, 1994,
and 1995 working groups existed for Bie, Bengo,
Huambo, Kwando Kubango, Kwanza Norte,
Lunda Norte, Lunda Sul, Malange, Menongue,
and Moxico. (See map below.)
The Humanitarian Coordination Group
The Lusaka Protocol, signed on 20 November
1994, established an organ known as the Joint
Commission to oversee the implementation of the
peace agreement. The Joint Commission com-
prised members of the UN, GoA, and UNITA.
Portugal, the Russian Federation, USA, and the
ICRC sat on the commission as observers. Ini-
tially, it was thought that the Joint Commission
should establish a sub-committee to deal with
humanitarian issues. However, humanitarian
agencies and some donors cited the continuing
need to separate humanitarian issues from the
political process; hence, an organ known as the
Humanitarian Coordination Group (HCG), was
created in January 1995.
The Humanitarian Coordination Group was a
mechanism through which the UN, GoA, and
UNITA could discuss humanitarian affairs at the
central level in Luanda.19 Members of the GoA
and UNITA were especially active in addressing
two issues: First, needs assessments to areas
which had not received any aid during 1993 and
1994; and, second, resolving problems in the field.
For example, when there was friction between the
FAA and NGOs in Matala, Huila province, UN,
government, and UNITA members worked to
settle the situation. Both of these activities
involved government personnel travelling to
areas under UNITA control and vice-versa,
thereby contributing enormously to confidence
building measures necessary to ensure the
success of the peace agreement. Further, the
group was replicated in some provinces, such as
Moxico, to allow decisions taken at the central,
policy level to be disseminated to key provinces.
(The HCG is discussed in more detail in section X
below).
                                                
19 UCAH decided that its parallel relations on
humanitarian affairs with the GoA and UNITA should
cease. There was no longer a war to justify contacting
the GoA in Luanda and UNITA’s leadership in
Huambo. (UNITA had actually left the city of Huambo
but was based in the north of the province, in
Bailundo). Instead, overall humanitarian assistance co-
ordination should include all actors and take place in
the capital, Luanda.
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VIII. PREPARING & LAUNCHING APPEALS
1993 Appeal Preparation and Launch
In April 1993, the humanitarian situation in
Angola was dire and deteriorating quickly. It had
not reached the catastrophic proportions once
experienced in the southern Sudan or Somalia but
it was widely felt that if concerted emergency
relief activities did not reach most areas of the
country within a few months, hundreds of thou-
sands of citizens would die. To address this issue,
humanitarian organisations would need signifi-
cant resources.
Angola was not a household name in 1993. It
was often referred to as, ‘The Forgotten War’.
International attention was much more fixed on
events in the former-Yugoslavia and Somalia. To
change this, UCAH decided to prepare a consoli-
dated inter-agency appeal. Besides enumerating
overall humanitarian needs and the proposed UN
agency response, the appeal process would call
attention to the humanitarian situation in Angola.
DHA Geneva and UN agencies with offices in
Angola sent staff members to Luanda to support
agency colleagues there prepare the appeal docu-
ment. The process lasted two weeks. Despite a
lack of basic information, such as the data on
population movements, agencies coped and pre-
sented the humanitarian situation based on the
available information.
Initially, NGOs were frustrated by the UN
agencies’ appeal process. NGOs felt that it did not
include them. UCAH explained that it was not be
possible to bring NGOs fully on board in the 1993
appeal process because there were no established
relations between the unit and NGOs. However,
UCAH did hold several meetings with NGOs
during the appeal’s preparation to inform them of
progress and obtain their views on their own
particular relief strategy. Further, UCAH
prepared a full chapter as an annex in the appeal
to explain UN-NGO relations, call on donors to
support NGO projects, show NGO activities by
province and sector, and list NGO project pro-
posals. While UCAH’s first appeal preparations
did not include NGOs as much as both groups
might have wished, collaboration was greater
than at any time previously in Angola.
The 1993 United Nations Consolidated Inter-
Agency Appeal for Angola was launched in Geneva
on 3 June by the SRSG, UCAH director, and UN
agency representatives. The document called for
US$ 226 million in multi-sectoral aid to be used to
assist almost 2 million beneficiaries, 345,000 of
whom were internally displaced persons
(IDPs).20 Initial donor commitments totalled
some US$ 70 million with Sweden and the United
States showing the largest support for the
process. By January 1994, confirmed pledges had
reached nearly half of the overall target—US$ 103
million.
Revised Appeal: February 1994
By January 1994, humanitarian operations were
taking place throughout Angola. UCAH had
brokered access to several new areas of the coun-
try, in which UN agencies and NGOs were work-
ing together to complement each other’s
strengths. The ICRC, too, began a large pro-
gramme in some areas, particularly in Huambo
province. All of these efforts, enabled agencies to
garner a far more accurate picture of the humani-
tarian situation, which now showed a staggering
3.3 million people in need of food or non-food
assistance. Almost 1 million of these people were
displaced, who had left their places of origin in
search of security. Consequently, UCAH and the
UN agencies decided to update the appeal to
make the call for financial and material resources
better reflect the situation in the country.
The revised appeal of February 1994 illus-
trated improved UN agency-NGO collaboration
by including a chapter on non-governmental
organisations and allowing NGOs to include
project summary sheets to explain their respective
projects. For the first time in the history of DHA
consolidated appeals, NGOs were making
specific project requests in the same document as
UN agencies. While some UN agencies felt that
allowing NGOs to advertise and ask for specific
support in a UN document would lessen UN
agency chances for receiving donor backing,
UCAH felt that showing overall needs and the
planned UN agency and NGO response would
generate stronger donor support. The inclusion of
NGO projects in the appeal promoted comple-
mentary action and further illustrated the shared
                                                
20  This figure and remaining figures referring to
appeal amounts include the value of food aid.
31
UN agency-NGO strategy for humanitarian inter-
vention.
The revised appeal also introduced the
concept of forward planning for mine action and
demobilisation and reintegration. While war
continued throughout much of the country there
were signs from Lusaka, where the SRSG was
negotiating a peace settlement with the GoA and
UNITA, that an agreement could be signed in the
near future.
In sum, the February 1994 revised appeal
called for donor contributions to the tune of US$
179 million for six months.
Revised Appeal: September 1994
DHA issued a second revision of the consolidated
inter-agency appeal in September 1994 for two
reasons. First, to report on the progress and con-
straints of the humanitarian operation since
February 1994; and, second, to extend the
appeal’s coverage to December 1994 thereby
bringing total resource requirements to almost
US$ 188 million with a funding shortfall of just
over US$ 61 million.
While 1994 had started full of hope with many
observers expecting the UN to broker a peace
agreement by the middle of the year, the opposite
happened. In May 1994, the war intensified and
reached heights of violence never before seen in
the country. In June, all UN-WFP cargo and
flights were grounded for nearly three weeks
because of the lack of security clearance. As of
September 1994, almost 3.7 million Angolans or
one third of the population was in need of some
form of emergency assistance to stay alive. In
essence, the stop-go pattern of the relief operation
since May wiped out the gains in the humanitar-
ian situation which UN agencies and NGOs
achieved between October 1993 and April 1994.
The increased fighting throughout Angola
during the previous months, made donors wary
of providing resources for a country that looked
like it was not moving towards peace. While
donors had responded relatively well to the
consolidated appeal process by providing 67.5
percent of the funds requested between 1
February and 31 August 1994, they wanted to see
some positive results in the political process
before committing themselves to further support.
1995 Appeal
The signing of the Lusaka Protocol on 20
November 1994 after thirteen months of negotia-
tions in the Zambian capital brought Angola its
best chance to move away from emergency relief
activities and on to long-term rehabilitation and
development. To prepare for this, UCAH devel-
oped a plan of action for the preparation of a
consolidated inter-agency appeal. The 1995
appeal was, without question, the culmination of
UCAH’s policy of involving all actors in humani-
tarian assistance in Angola to tap on their respec-
tive strengths.
To reflect the new political situation, humani-
tarian organisations, in consultation with the
GoA, agreed that a three-pronged humanitarian
programme should be planned: humanitarian
assistance including relief, resettlement, and repa-
triation; mine action; and, demobilisation and
reintegration. As with the previous three appeals,
the 1995 document was prepared by sector. UN
agencies and NGOs were called on to select a lead
UN agency and NGO for each sector: food pro-
duction and basic rural capacity; food aid; nutri-
tion and household food security; water and sani-
tation; health; shelter, relief, and survival; educa-
tion and assistance to children in difficult circum-
stances; and, logistics. Each sector’s UN agency
and NGO representative then organised planning
sessions with other humanitarian organisations
involved in the respective sector to write the
chapter corresponding to that sector. For
example, UN agencies chose UNICEF and NGOs
selected Save the Children Fund-UK to represent
them in the education sector. UNICEF and SCF-
UK were then responsible for organising
meetings with the Ministry of Education, UN
agencies and NGOs involved in the education
sector so that, together, they could prepare the
section explaining the current situation and the
way in which to address the issue during 1995.
This process was repeated for the sections on
mine action, and demobilisation and
reintegration, which UCAH-CMAO and UCAH-
DRO led on behalf of the UN.
The 1995 appeal included the most extensive
chapter on non-governmental organisations to
date. Angolan and expatriate NGOs chose Acção
para o Desenvolvimento Rural e Ambiente
(ADRA–Angolana) and Save the Children
Fund–UK to represent them, respectively. They
were responsible for coordinating the production
of the chapter titled, ‘Non-Governmental
Organisations’. NGOs decided to include the
following sections in their chapter: strategy;
emergency to rehabilitation; reinforcing national
capacities; networking and programme extension;
financing; list of NGOs and ICRC operating in
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Angola; matrix showing NGO activities by sector
and province; list of proposed/ongoing projects
for 1995 and financial resources needed.21
Throughout the chapter NGOs stated their view
that complementary UN-NGO humanitarian
operations, based on the model developed during
1993 and 1994, should continue throughout 1995
with enhanced UN coordination and quick-
disbursement funding mechanisms such as the
ASDI-UCAH Mechanism.
Capacity building for the government and
national NGOs was the recurring theme through-
out the appeal process and was reflected as such
in the document. UN agencies and expatriate
NGOs committed themselves to expanding their
programmes to include enhanced capacity build-
ing for national institutions and Angolan NGOs.
The mine action chapter explained in detail the
strategy to help the Angolan Government create a
national institute for mine action by the end of
1995. Likewise, the demobilisation and reintegra-
tion chapter highlighted the need for UCAH-DRO
to support the establishment of an Angolan insti-
tute for demobilisation and reintegration. Finally,
concerning coordination, UCAH announced its
hope to withdraw from Angola by mid-1996, and
explained that in order to hand over coordination
to the government’s Ministry of Social Affairs
(MINARS) by then, the unit would work closely
with MINARS to enable it to carry out the task
successfully.
The 1995 United Nations Consolidated Inter-
Agency Appeal for Angola called for donor con-
tributions totalling some US$ 213 million, split
amongst the three programmes: US$ 145 million
for humanitarian assistance (relief, resettlement,
and repatriation); US$ 12 million for the mine
action programme; and, US$ 56 million for
demobilisation and reintegration.
A Model Launch
DHA launched the 1995 appeal on 23 February
1995. The event was termed a ‘Donors’ Consul-
tation’, which briefed those present on the overall
situation in Angola, then allowed the UCAH
director to place the humanitarian situation
within that context and outline the planned UN
agency and NGO response to overall humanitar-
ian needs. Thereafter, GoA and UNITA represen-
tatives had the opportunity to speak, and this was
                                                
21  NGOs chose not to include project summary sheets,
which briefly explain an individual agency’s specific
project and its cost, in the appeal. NGOs explained that,
as far as they were concerned, the appeal should
highlight programmes, not individual projects.
followed by member state delegates who
announced their respective country’s
contribution. The consultation started at 10:00 am
and finished just after 4:00 pm and included the
schedule outlined below:
– Statement by the SRSG on the overall political,
military, and humanitarian situation in Angola.
– Presentation of the 1995 United Nations Con-
solidated Inter-Agency Appeal for Angola by the
UCAH director. This presentation incorporated
details of the humanitarian assistance activities
of all UN agencies and other humanitarian
agencies active in Angola, and included a
straightforward set of overhead slides to
imprint the main themes of the document, as
well as the key financial and food resources
being requested on the minds of those present.
– Statement by the prime minister of Angola.
– Statement by the UNITA representative to the
United Nations in Geneva.
– Statements by the representatives of the obser-
ver countries (Portugal, the Russian Federation,
and the United States of America).
– Statements by representatives of UN member
states.
– Statements by representatives of non-govern-
mental organisations.
– Closing statement by the SRSG.
33
IX. SECURITY ISSUES
Procedures for Airlifts & Convoys
When UCAH was established, the World Food
Programme flew relief commodities and
personnel to accessible government towns in
Angola. The agency had no contact with UNITA
therefore it could not fly to any of the areas that
the party occupied. UNHCR was the only UN
agency flying to UNITA zones. On occasion, the
agency chartered a commercial cargo company to
fly on its behalf to M’Banza Congo or Uige, in the
north of Angola. Both of these agencies took strict
security measures. During the third week of
April, however, UNITA shot down a WFP
aeroplane outside Luena, and six weeks later on
15 July 1993 UNITA attacked a second WFP
aeroplane, as it came in to land in M’Banza
Congo.
These two incidents led UCAH to conduct a
number of policy meetings on security
procedures for humanitarian operations.22
UCAH drafted the procedures, which included
recommendations made by the GoA and UNITA.
UCAH and UN agencies discussed the
procedures and agreed to them. They acted as
guidelines for what was to become one of the
UN’s largest relief operations by air: at the
programme’s peak, the WFP carried out some 200
cargo and personnel flights per week to almost
thirty destinations. During 1994, the WFP
delivered over 110,000 MTs of food and non-food
relief by air.
Regarding road convoys, which accounted for
about half of aid deliveries in Angola, UCAH and
WFP worked out safety procedures. However,
based on an incident on 27 August 1993 during
which three Angolan truck drivers died while
carrying out work for WFP in Benguela province,
the SRSG called on UN agencies to enhance secu-
rity procedures by combining the existing
approach with UNAVEM’s procedures. While the
goal was to strengthen ongoing security
measures, the use of UNAVEM did not achieve
this. First, the mission’s field presence was
restricted so it rarely had primary information on
the security situation; second, involving
                                                
22 UCAH benefited from one of its senior staff
member’s expertise in security matters and operational
experience in Angola to allow it to take a leadership
role on security.
UNAVEM in security clearances made the
procedures unnecessarily bureaucratic.
The participatory elaboration of and strict
adherence to security guidelines for the airlift and
road convoys contributed to the lack of serious
injuries or deaths sustained by aid workers
during the aid operation in 1993 and 1994.
Cross-line Operations: Kuito
A fierce battle took place for the city of Kuito
from January to September 1993. When it ended,
the city was divided with the GoA controlling
about forty percent of it and the airport, and
UNITA controlling sixty percent of the city and
all of the surrounding countryside. A UN staff
member was in the city during all of the siege and
kept almost daily radio contact with the ECU
until April 1993 and UCAH thereafter. His
reports and others from the city indicated terrible
human loss and a humanitarian situation far
worse than elsewhere in the country. As
explained above, UCAH spent considerable time
trying to gain access to the city and when, on 15
October 1993, a UN assessment team finally
landed in Kuito it confirmed that a large
operation would have to be mounted
immediately.
Kuito was an operational challenge for UN
agencies and NGOs. UCAH negotiated the
following procedures with both sides.
– One WFP cargo aeroplane landed at Kuito air-
port. WFP workers unloaded the aeroplane’s
cargo into two trucks.
– The two trucks left the airport, directly outside
of which there was an ‘humanitarian com-
mittee’ comprising GoA and UNITA members
who verified that both trucks held only human-
itarian cargo.
– UNITA controlled the road from the airport to
the city and placed one checkpoint along the
stretch. Both trucks stopped at the checkpoint
and continued only after being waved on by
the respective UNITA controllers.
– At the end of the road leading from the airport
to the town centre, one truck continued straight
ahead and travelled into the UNITA part of the
city, while the other truck turned right and
stopped at a second UNITA check-point, where
it was cleared to leave the zone under the
party’s control. After crossing a roundabout,
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the truck stopped at a GoA checkpoint and
entered the part of Kuito under government
control.
– Once in its respective part of the city, each
truck proceeded to a warehouse where WFP
staff unloaded it.
– NGOs working with WFP picked up the food
or non-food items in one of the two ware-
houses and implemented projects on either the
GoA side of Kuito or in an UNITA area nearby.
– Expatriate UN agency and NGO staff could
work in both parts of the town but they had to
cross from one zone into the other at special
check-points.
– UN agency and NGO offices and houses were
on the GoA side of Kuito.
– The arrival and departure of cargo and per-
sonnel aeroplanes took place after authorisa-
tion was received from Luanda and Huambo,
and the commanders on the ground were
aware of schedules.
The political, military, and humanitarian situation
in Kuito was tense, and the slightest incident
could flare into a skirmish. The GoA had man-
aged to hold on to the city despite all odds to the
contrary, and could continue to do so only if it
received supplies from Luanda. The government,
therefore, commissioned aeroplanes to fly over
the city and drop pallets of equipment for gov-
ernment troops in that hope that the pallets fell in
the GoA zone. Sometimes they did; at other times
they did not. When they fell into UNITA’s zone
or areas controlled by neither the GoA or UNITA,
troops fought over the spoils. This became
extremely dangerous, at times.
From October 1993 to July 1994, aid workers
were evacuated from Kuito on four occasions.
One evacuation took place by road. Aid workers
crossed from the government zone to the UNITA
zone, after which the party escorted them west to
the city of Huambo. Once in Huambo, the work-
ers were flown to Luanda. Usually, however, it
was impossible for aid workers to cross from the
government to the UNITA zone, hence they were
stuck until the skirmish ended.
The worst of such incidents started on 26 May
1994 when staff from UN agencies, NGOs, and
the ICRC were in the city. The workers were able
to gather in two bunkers which the ICRC and
MSF had prepared. During more than one week,
the staff members stayed in the bunkers maintain-
ing HF contact with their respective agency and
UCAH, which was planning their evacuation.
UCAH was in a strong position to organise
evacuations. First, the unit’s direct link to the
SRSG enabled it to benefit from his high-level
contacts with both sides to the conflict. Second,
the unit had instant access to the GoA in Luanda
and to UNITA in Huambo and constantly kept
both sides informed of the situation on the
ground and how it affected aid workers stuck in
dangerous circumstances. Third, UCAH’s work-
ing relations with UN agencies and NGOs were
good. For example, UCAH could always count on
WFP’s collaboration to provide the logistics for
evacuations.
As soon as the 26 May crisis broke, UCAH
negotiated with the GoA in Luanda and with
UNITA in Huambo to gain authorisation to carry
out an evacuation. After considerable discussion,
both sides granted permission for 4 June. Given
the tense military situation on the ground, UCAH
set up a structure whereby a high-level govern-
ment official could be contacted in Luanda as
events unfolded. Likewise,  UNITA’s
humanitarian affairs coordinator was with the
UCAH field adviser in Huambo monitoring
events so that if problems occurred, messages
could be sent by the GoA and UNITA to their
respective people on the ground in Kuito.
On 4 June, two small passenger aeroplanes
flew to the city. While one aeroplane landed, the
other circled overhead. WFP’s country director
travelled on the aeroplane that landed and main-
tained constant contact with UCAH in Luanda
and Huambo via HF radio.
After the first aeroplane landed, the humani-
tarian staff stuck in the city began to move from
the GoA part into the UNITA zone, and on to the
airport. The staff got stuck at the last UNITA
check-point. Someone had not instructed the
soldiers at the check-point to let the staff leave the
city, and without clear orders the soldiers would
not do so. The agency staff in Kuito contacted the
WFP country director via walkie-talkie. He in
turn relayed a message via HF radio to UCAH
Luanda. This message was picked up by UCAH
Huambo which immediately discussed the issue
with the UNITA humanitarian affairs coordina-
tor. He contacted UNITA’s military who sent a
message to Kuito. Within a few minutes the prob-
lem was solved and the staff proceeded to the air-
port and left the city.
In sum, UCAH brokered a ‘window’ with both
sides to the conflict so that aid workers who were
in danger and could no longer work in the area
could be evacuated. UCAH organised and man-
aged such evacuations, with the full operational
support of WFP logistics, almost one dozen times
during 1993 and 1994 and gained a reputation for
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being willing and able to support operational
agencies with their primary concern: security for
their staff and equipment.
Freedom of Movement Crises
One of the basic principles on which humanitar-
ian agencies counted to carry out their pro-
grammes was freedom of movement for its per-
sonnel and property. (See section IV above).
Without it, agencies could not work. This was
explained to both sides to the conflict on several
occasions. Despite this, three incidents during
which the principle was violated occurred.
On 17 October 1993, the aid operation to Kuito
was just getting under way. UNITA had
approved three cargo flights to the city that day
on the understanding that one cargo flight would
go to Huambo in accordance with the flight plan
that WFP had organised. WFP and NGO staff
travelled to Kuito on the first cargo flight and
were to return to Luanda on the third. After the
second flight had landed in Kuito, however, and
no flight had gone to Huambo, UNITA
announced that the third WFP flight could not
land in Kuito; hence the aid workers were stuck.
At the time, the military situation in the city was
extremely tense and fighting could have broken
out at any moment. If aid workers could not go to
and leave the city at will, it would be too danger-
ous to carry out programmes there. The UCAH
director flew to Kuito on the third flight and
negotiated with UNITA from the aeroplane, but
he was unable to gain the party’s authorisation to
land. Consequently, UCAH travelled to Huambo
the following day, with the support of UNICEF
and WFP, to negotiate access for a passenger
aeroplane to go to Kuito to pick-up the aid
workers.
The city of Malange was under siege through-
out 1993 and 1994 and probably harboured the
worst malnutrition in Angola. For example, in
October 1993 up to 250 children were starving per
day in the city. WFP organised an airlift to the
city delivering some 1,000 MTs of food and non-
food aid each week for UN agency and NGO
projects. On average, ten WFP cargo flights flew
to Malange per day. On several occasions, partic-
ularly on 2–3 March and 16–19 May 1994, cargo
and passenger flights landing or already on the
ground in Malange were hit by mortar shells.
These incidents led to extensive negotiations
between UCAH and UNITA, which at one stage
claimed responsibility for the incidents by blam-
ing ‘bad communications’; although the party
later retracted the statement and denied any
involvement. While UCAH’s discussions on
Malange were generally successful and usually
led to the resumption of programmes, aid
workers frequently got stuck in the city while
such negotiations took place.23 At one stage,
UCAH’s field adviser in Malange, who had gone
to the city on a Saturday and was due back in
Luanda the following Monday, got stuck in the
city for thirty-eight days.
The GoA stopped all UN and ICRC cargo
flights to Huambo and Uige effective 22 May 1994
explaining that if the UN could not fly to Malange
safely, it could not do so to Huambo and Uige.
Personnel flights could continue, thereby
allowing UN agency, NGO, and ICRC personnel
the freedom to go to and leave both cities. UCAH
worked hard to convince the GoA that it should
allow humanitarian flights to continue to
Huambo and Uige, particularly to Huambo
where hundreds of thousands of Angolans
needed aid to survive. However, these
negotiations were unsuccessful. UNITA re-
sponded to the government’s move by refusing to
authorise any cargo or personnel flights nation-
wide, effective 13 June. Further, UNITA stopped
UN agencies, NGOs, and the ICRC from leaving
the city of Huambo by road claiming that the
GoA was bombing different parts of Huambo
province and that it was not safe. Information
indicated, however, that the least safe place in the
province was the city of Huambo itself, against
which the GoA’s air force was waging an air
campaign. Arrangements were made to fly the
UCAH director to Huambo so that he and the
UCAH field adviser could negotiate with
UNITA’s leadership. Upon arrival, however,
UNITA refused to speak to the director and
insisted that he leave the city immediately. In
addition, they obliged those who wished to leave
the city to stay. As of that moment, the United
Nations considered all UN and NGO humanita-
rian staff in Huambo to be there without freedom
of movement. The SRSG and troika ambassadors
protested vehemently and called on UNITA to
allow humanitarian staff to move as necessary to
carry out their work. This the party did, and UN
agencies and NGOs left the city of Huambo on 17
June 1994 in protest over UNITA’s actions.24
                                                
23 On several occasions, the SRSG spoke to the GoA
and UNITA at the highest level about the targeting of
WFP aeroplanes in Malange. This most likely helped to
resolve problems.
24 The ICRC and MSF did not participate in the
protest and stayed in Huambo. The country director of
CARE International also stayed in Huambo, although
all other CARE staff left.
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Security Coordination when Aid Workers are
Under Threat
Huambo was Angola’s second largest city and
stood strategically in the centre of the country. It
was occupied by UNITA in March 1993, after a
fifty-five days of heavy fighting. Humanitarian
needs in Huambo were acute because of the fight-
ing and UN agencies, NGOs, and the ICRC
placed considerable emphasis on gaining access
to the city and the province and starting pro-
grammes there. Aid agencies’ efforts were ham-
pered by political and military considerations,
however, and emergency relief activities only
expanded in October 1993.
UCAH placed a representative in Huambo in
February 1994. In addition to its main function of
overall coordination of humanitarian assistance,
UCAH collected and shared information related
to security in order to support aid workers’ safety
when necessary. UCAH initiated and led many
meetings in Luanda and Huambo related to secu-
rity. For example, one priority was to make the
Angolan Government in Luanda and UNITA in
Huambo sensitive to humanitarian organisations’
concerns and to keep both parties informed about
security incidents affecting UN agencies and
NGOs. The meetings that UCAH led enabled UN
agencies, NGOs, and the ICRC to discuss and
analyse security issues. It also allowed security
information related to humanitarian affairs to be
centralised and passed on to the Special
Representative of the Secretary-General, who
maintained separate contacts with the Angolan
Government and UNITA. In Huambo, UCAH
took the following steps on behalf of UN agencies
and NGOs to improve security conditions there:
– wrote a security plan and shared it for com-
ments with UN agencies, NGOs, and the ICRC.
The security plan was updated every two
months and handed to UNITA;
– organised the provision and maintenance of
communications equipment, including a
repeater for ultra-high frequency (UHF), HF
radio with telex-over-radio capacity, and a
satellite telephone for emergency use;25
                                                
25 UCAH and UNDP were slow to place
communications equipment in Huambo: The HF base
station was installed in March 1994; telex over radio
arrived the following month; the satellite telephone
was delivered in July 1994; and the UHF repeater,
necessary to enable aid workers to communicate from
– built a large bunker for all UN agency and
NGO staff, and encouraged NGOs to build
smaller bunkers at their residences and offices;
and
– monitored security events and shared security
information with UN agencies, NGOs, and the
ICRC on a regular basis.
In late October 1994, the Angolan Government’s
army began an advance on the city of Huambo
from the west and the south. UCAH Huambo
called on agencies observe the recommendations
in the security plan, and coordinated meetings
each morning and evening to review the
situation. UCAH Luanda, in consultation with the
SRSG, took measures to evacuate humanitarian
staff. This included sending a UN Boeing 727
from Luanda to the city. The mission failed
because UNITA did not think it safe for the
aeroplane to land in Huambo.
During the first days of November, the gov-
ernment’s advance towards the city continued.
UNITA prepared to defend the city and encour-
aged the population to leave. This caused some
panic and security events, such as theft and loot-
ing, increased. Most residents expected a battle
similar to the ‘fifty-five days’ which rocked the
city from January to March 1993.
UCAH coordinated UN agency-NGO meet-
ings in Luanda and Huambo to analyse the situa-
tion. This led the UN agency and NGO represen-
tatives in Huambo to adopt phase III of the
‘Huambo Security Plan’, which indicated moving
to a UN building or a previously agreed to alter-
native. A consensus was reached amongst UN
agencies and NGOs to accept ICRC’s invitation to
move to the ICRC Huambo complex in Bomb
Alta., about 3 km east of the city centre. The
compound was not in the line of fire and was
slightly outside the city. Organisations agreed
that the aid workers would be safer together and
by Saturday 5 November 1994 all expatriate aid
workers (31 ICRC and 23 UN agency and NGO)
were at Bomb Alta.
Three people were managing events at Bomb
Alta: The ICRC officer-in-charge, the ICRC
Geneva security adviser, and the UCAH field
adviser. (The ICRC head of delegation was away).
This group of three handled organisation, secu-
rity, and diplomacy respectively. They
maintained contact with UNITA and the FAA
(once the latter had taken control of the city), and
                                                                          
one end of the city to the other, arrived in September.
At times, UCAH had to rely on the better
communications equipment of organisations, such as
Concern and the ICRC, to carry out its work.
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gathered as much information as possible on
events as they unfolded. All of this information
was passed on to UCAH Luanda, which
forwarded it to the SRSG in Lusaka so that he,
too, could maintain contact with the Angolan
Government and UNITA on the issue.
In Luanda, UCAH became the operations
centre for UN agencies and NGOs, and liaised
with the UNAVEM security office and the ICRC
delegation constantly. (UNAVEM did not have
any personnel in Huambo). Staff worked around
the clock to maintain an operations room with
maps and the HF communications room. In addi-
tion, UCAH held briefings for embassies, which
had nationals in Huambo.
The FAA was coordinating its advance and
occupation of Huambo from Catumbela,
Benguela province, hence UCAH asked two of its
field advisers and the WFP country director to go
there to strengthen UN contacts with the Angolan
Government and its army. The three UN staff
members were joined by the ICRC-Huambo head
of delegation, who had been outside Angola
when events started, and, together, they worked
with UCAH and the ICRC in Luanda and
Huambo to support the safety and evacuation of
the UN agency-NGO-ICRC aid workers.
Two days after the FAA had occupied the city of
Huambo, the UN and the ICRC decided on a joint
evacuation of the fifty-four aid workers. The WFP
country director accompanied an ICRC
DC-3 aeroplane to Huambo, where the UCAH
field adviser made arrangements for all aid
workers to move to the airport with the FAA
guaranteeing safe passage. Once at Huambo air-
port, the field adviser met the FAA’s local com-
mander and established communications with the
WFP country director aboard the DC-3 so that the
aeroplane could land safely. Having landed, the
aid workers entered the aircraft and departed for
Catumbela airport. Upon arrival, UN and ICRC
aeroplanes flew the aid workers to Luanda where
all arrived in the evening of Friday 11 November
1994.
Several lessons were learned from the events
in Huambo:
– UCAH’s coordination of the integrated UN-
NGO-ICRC effort enabled centralised informa-
tion sharing and analysis;
– UCAH promptly shared all information with
the SRSG, who was in Lusaka, so that he could
discuss issues with Angolan Government and
UNITA representatives there;
– UCAH took advantage of all available means
and capacities in Luanda, Huambo, and
Benguela;
– communications equipment (including HF
radios, telex-over-radio, and satellite tele-
phones) allowed all actors in Luanda, Huambo,
and Benguela to maintain contact around the
clock;
– the team of UCAH field advisers and the WFP
country director in Benguela, where the FAA
had its operation’s headquarters, enabled the
UN to maintain around-the-clock relations
with the FAA’s decision makers;
– humanitarian staff Huambo worked as a team;
and
– the UN-NGO-ICRC press black-out until the
aid workers were successfully evacuated
allowed decision makers to concentrate on
security issues and minimised press
speculation about events.
Security Recommendations for Luanda
and Angola
During 1993 and 1994, government police and
security forces controlled ordinary crime quite
well in areas under GoA control. Luanda was a
relatively safe city during most of 1993 and 1994.
Shortly after the signing of the Lusaka Protocol,
however, expatriates and later Angolans became
the targets of organised crime. Most cases were
violent and involved groups of armed men hold-
ing up expatriates outside restaurants to steal
their vehicles or of following them home and
entering residences to steal all of their belongings.
Physical violence against expatriates and
Angolans became more prevalent as 1995 pro-
gressed.
This situation led to UCAH writing and dis-
seminating an extensive document on security
measures to be taken in Luanda and the
provinces to reduce the risk of becoming a victim
of crime. The paper also included a section on
correct radio use, medical evacuations, and
additional security measures for staff members in
the provinces.
Evacuation of Foreigners
The city of Kuito was long known to be one of
Angola’s gems: a colonial town surrounded by
rolling hills in the country’s highlands. Many Por-
tuguese families moved to Kuito during the colo-
nial period and decided to stay when Angola
became independent.
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In January 1993, the battle for Kuito began
between the GoA and UNITA. UNITA was
shunted out of the city initially, but laid siege to it
and started to edge its way back in. UNITA had
great difficulty re-entering the town and taking
control of it, despite the party having won over
eighty percent of the vote there in the September
1992 elections. The battle of Kuito continued
mercilessly until UNITA declared a unilateral
cease-fire effective 20 September 1993. The gov-
ernment troops in Kuito reciprocated and fighting
stopped for the first time in nine months.
The Portuguese Embassy in Luanda was par-
ticularly concerned about its citizens in Kuito. It
was unclear if the lull in the fighting would last
so the embassy pushed for a quick evacuation of
any foreigners who wished to leave. In such
cases, the International Committee of the Red
Cross is usually called on to organise evacuations.
Indeed, three months earlier in Huambo, the
ICRC had negotiated and managed the exodus of
hundreds of Portuguese from that city. On 30
September, UNITA issued a communiqué
explaining that, in its view, ‘Conditions were
fulfilled for the evacuation of foreigners...in
[Kuito]’, and that, ‘the modalities of the
evacuation will be coordinated with the Special
Representative of the Secretary-General’.
In early-October, UNITA informed the SRSG
that a mission to Kuito was possible. On 15
October UCAH led the first needs assessment
mission to Kuito since the siege had started, and a
large aid programme started the following day.
The SRSG and UCAH took advantage of the posi-
tive momentum to push for the foreigners’ evacu-
ation. The GoA and UNITA gave their permission
for the process to take place on 22 October 1993.
On that day, UCAH and WFP organised the
evacuation from Kuito to Luanda of 121 citizens:
94 Portuguese, 18 Cape Verdeans, 6 São Tomeans,
and 3 Brazilians. Transport was provided from
the city centre to the airport in an open truck. At
the airport, the evacuees boarded a cargo
aeroplane, which flew them to São Tomé, where
the respective embassies assumed custody of
their citizens.
Monitoring the Road Situation
Throughout the war in Angola, UCAH tried to
negotiate access from the coast to the major towns
in the interior along one of the two major road
corridors: Luanda–N’Dalatando–Malange and
Benguela/Lobito-Huambo-Kuito. Unfortunately,
these negotiations did not succeed during the
war, probably because both sides were concerned
that the use of such road corridors would lead to
a military advantage for the other side. If the
main road corridors had been open humanitarian
organisations would have gained access to
several communities along the corridors and
saved millions of dollars that were spent on the
airlift. Shortly after the Lusaka Protocol was
signed, UCAH once again approached the GoA
and UNITA and encouraged them to open the
roads. Indeed, freedom of movement for people
and goods was part of the peace agreement.
In theory, the UNAVEM was the best
equipped organisation to assess and monitor the
road situation in Angola after the Lusaka Protocol
was signed. UNAVEM had over fifty team sites
dotted around the nation by April 1995. Its
observers were active, whenever possible, driving
around their team site areas to assess the condi-
tion of the roads and bridges. Many of the
UNAVEM observers had specific qualifications to
do this and wrote useful situation reports. How-
ever, the road information from the team sites
was not consolidated at UNAVEM headquarters.
In light of this, UCAH started a small data
base of information on roads and bridges in
Angola. The unit asked UN agencies and IOs/
NGOs to provide any relevant information that
they and a staff member in UCAH-CMAO
collated it. UCAH also kept a map, which was
updated daily, showing which roads were open,
suspected of being open, and closed. This infor-
mation was shared with UNAVEM whenever it
came in, and with UN agencies and NGOs at
Monday briefings and by way of the Information
Bulletin. Monitoring the road situation in Angola
in this way allowed UCAH to organise humani-
tarian missions along part or all of the two most
important corridors, and to make recommenda-





While UCAH did not have any specific capacity
building projects for the government, the unit’s
staff spent considerable time and effort working
with members of the government at the central
and provincial levels to include them in all
aspects of disaster response coordination:
assessment, planning, monitoring, information
exchange, and resource. As mentioned above, the
GoA controlled only about twenty percent of the
country when UCAH was established and the
government asked the UN to coordinate
humanitarian activities on its behalf. UCAH did
not take this position at face value, however, and
actively encouraged the government (principally
the Ministry of Social Affairs, MINARS) to get as
involved as possible in the coordination and
implementation of emergency relief activities.
MINARS promoted government activities
throughout the emergency. Although the over-
whelming percentage of the government’s budget
was spent on defence during 1993 and 1994, the
GoA did make the following contributions to
humanitarian assistance: In 1993, the GoA con-
tributed US$ 10 million on relief items, of which
US$ 6 million went toward food aid, US$ 3.6
million on the non-food items, and US$ 400,000
on seeds and tools. In addition, the GoA spent
Nkw 6 billion on dried fish and salt at local mar-
kets to complement the diets of IDPs. Finally, the
GoA exempted humanitarian organisations from
paying airport fees for their aircraft and sold fuel
at subsidised prices.26
The signing of the Lusaka Protocol on 20
November 1994 demanded a change in the co-
ordination mechanism which had existed during
the previous eighteen months. While war raged,
UCAH maintained separate, parallel discussions
with the government in Luanda and UNITA in
Huambo. In times of peace, however, UCAH felt
that all coordination should take place in Luanda.
Consequently, the Humanitarian Coordination
Group (HCG) was established. This group, which
was headed by the Minister for Social Affairs and
the UCAH director, included members from
Angolan governmental ministries, UNITA, and
UNHCR, UNICEF, and WFP. Observer status was
granted to some donors (European Union,
                                                
26 1994 United Nations Revised Consolidated Inter-Agency
Appeal for Angola, February 1994, p. 29.
Portugal, Russian Federation, and USA), NGOs
(one Angolan and one international) and the
ICRC. (See section VIII above). The humanitarian
coordination group had the following objectives:
– improve general understanding of the humani-
tarian crisis in Angola by promoting needs
assessments and sectoral evaluation missions;
– monitor access to civilians in need and make
recommendations to the Joint Commission, as
necessary;
– gather and analyse information to make
recommendations concerning food security;
– track financial contributions to the 1995 Con-
solidated Inter-Agency Appeal for Angola and
encourage donors to support NGO pro-
grammes;27
– facilitate information exchange with donors
and NGOs about humanitarian needs and the
financial and human resource capacity to
respond; and
– keep the Joint Commission informed about the
humanitarian situation in the country.
The Humanitarian Coordination Group included
a small secretariat, which was responsible for
organising meetings, preparing briefing notes,
and monitoring the implementation of decisions
that were taken by the group. UCAH put
considerable effort into the HCG, assigning one
international staff member to work with it almost
full-time in the hope that it would provide a
forum in which Angolan leaders could increase
their capacity to take on the task of humanitarian
coordination. Further, as part of a preparedness
capacity building exercise, UCAH felt that the
HCG should be able to manage and coordinate
any future emergencies that might affect Angola.
The diagram below shows the HCG’s links to
various entities involved in humanitarian affairs
in Angola.
Institute of Mine Action
Mine action (an overall term to cover mine
awareness, survey, clearance, and training) was,
as noted earlier, particularly important in Angola,
a country that might have more mines than
people and the record holder for ‘amputees per
capita’. The issue had to be dealt with compre-
hensively to rehabilitate the country after war and
                                                
27 DHA Geneva and UCAH tracked the response to
previous appeals during 1993 and 1994 and worked
closely with the HCG on this task.
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provide a base for long-term development. While
many believed mine action to be a military issue,
which was normally handled by military or
peace-keeping components of governments or the
United Nations, the organisations involved in
humanitarian assistance in Angola believed that
the issue was a long-term problem that affected
civilians; hence a humanitarian agency should
coordinate the process.
Initial coordination of mine action was
handled by UCAH, which created the Central
Mine Action Office (UCAH-CMAO). The office
worked closely with the government to ensure
the eventual hand-over of coordination from the
UN to the GoA, which was preparing to
coordinate and manage the issue by creating a
national institute for mine action.
Institute of Demobilisation and Reintegration
According to UCAH, the successful demobilisa-
tion and reintegration of soldiers hinged on actu-
ally ‘converting’ former combatants into civilians.
This, in the view of the unit, could be accom-
plished best by allowing civilians to handle the
process. As mentioned above (see section VI)
much work took place during 1994 to prepare for
demobilisation and reintegration, based on past
experience of Angola and other countries in the
world. Such experiences showed that the estab-
lishment of an Angolan institute should take
place but that it should include members from the
GoA and UNITA. Hence, work undertaken by
UCAH’s Demobilisation and Reintegration Office
(UCAH-DRO) during 1994 and 1995 highlighted
the need to capacitate the GoA and UNITA to
assume such a responsibility.
Capacity Building for UNITA
During the war of 1993 and 1994, the United
Nations considered UNITA an illegal occupant of
much of Angola. UNITA was not a political equal
to the Government of Angola, which was elected
in a democratic process deemed ‘generally free
and fair’. UCAH did not approach UNITA with
the same capacity building ideas that were
offered to the government, for example
management and coordination. However, UCAH
promoted the incorporation of some of the party’s
members into aspects of the humanitarian
programme, such as the assessment and design of
agriculture and health projects throughout
Huambo province. When the Lusaka Protocol
was signed and the Humanitarian Coordination
Group was created, UNITA was invited to
participate in overall capacity building efforts.
Angolan NGOs
The nature of emergency relief, which was high
profile and expensive, discriminated against
Angolan NGOs. UCAH’s policy was to create an
environment in which Angolan and international
NGOs were as equal as possible. The Letter of
Affiliation, an agreement on cooperation between
NGOs and the UN in Angola, provided a good
basis for this. As part of the agreement NGOs
received UN endorsed identity cards and access
to free transport to project sites on UN personnel
aircraft. Further, the unit decided that the work-
ing language with NGOs was in the Angolan
national language, Portuguese. Almost all corre-
spondence and information sent to NGOs and
UCAH’s NGO meetings were held in Portuguese.
UCAH encouraged Angolan NGOs to partici-
pate in humanitarian assessments and pro-
grammes. The unit provided support to national
NGOs writing programme proposals and helped
them establish contacts with UN agencies, such as
UNICEF and WFP. UCAH addressed the
resource problem encountered by Angolan NGOs
in the scope of the ASDI-UCAH Mechanism. The
Swedish Government, which allocated money to
this fund, initially preferred that UCAH not rec-
ommend Angolan NGO projects for financing
unless an expatriate NGO could oversee the pro-
ject’s implementation. At first, UCAH handled
this by insisting that expatriate NGO projects
with capacity building components for Angolan
NGOs be given priority funding. Four months
later, UCAH succeeded in convincing the donor
to change its position so that funds could be
transferred directly from the Swedish
Government to Angolan NGOs.
Preparing for Transition from UCAH to UNDP
UCAH promoted the policy that relief activities
be placed in a development context. The signing
of the Lusaka Protocol signalled the impending
‘end’ of the emergency and hence UCAH’s exit
from Angola. Within the UN system, the United
Nations Development Programme was respon-
sible for supporting the government’s efforts to
develop the country. The agency developed a
strategy to support the GoA design a programme
for the national rehabilitation of Angola, and
UCAH worked very closely with UNDP to ensure
complementary UCAH/UNDP activities leading
to a smooth transition from the UN’s humani-
tarian structure to that of the Angolan
Government.28
                                                
28 The UCAH director assumed the positions of
UNDP resident representative and UN resident co-
ordinator in September 1994 and continued all three
roles until he left Angola in June 1995.
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